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Perhaps the most famous achievement of Thomas Aquinas lies in his robust 
conception of nature and the natural world in the face of an  uncompromis- 
ing theology of grace and divine operation. As is well known, the Aristote- 
lian conception of nature enables Aquinas to steer clear of both 
occasionalism and naturalism and to affirm the reality of secondary causes 
in the natural world.1 Nevertheless, is nature itself to be understood as a 
secondary cause of cosmic events? A recent and prevalent answer is that 
Aquinas correctly understood that nature in Aristotle is not an efficient 
cause but a spontaneous source of regular, 'agentless' or 'causeless' changes 
in the mineral, vegetative, and animal world.2 This position, in my view, 
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remains an important corrective for those who see in all Aristotelian physics
an animism or biologism. Still, the position as regards Aquinas veers too
close to naturalism by failing to explain how all natural events, for him, are
dependent on a cause of motion. Only a return to Aquinas's conception of
nature itself will reveal this causal dependence.
The aforementioned position has been most forcefully articulated by
James Weisheipl.3 In some nine articles and three books, Weisheipl has
elaborated two main theses: first, that nature in Aristotelian philosophy is
an intrinsic, dynamic principle that accounts for the spontaneous yet regu-
lar behavior displayed by the universe's bodies; second, that nature is
nevertheless not an interior 'motor' or 'mover' producing such behavior
after the model of a soul or a bodily organ, for example. In developing
these theses, Weisheipl sought to counter certain commonplace evalu-
ations of the natural philosophy inspired by Aristotle. According to one
such evaluation, the dynamic conception of nature results from Aristotle's
faulty biologism and can and should be separated from what is his abiding
contribution, his metaphysics of static, hylomorphic essences.4 According
3. In addition to Weisheipl's works cited below, distinctive accounts of 'agent-
less' motion in Aquinas can be found in James A. McWilliams, Physics and Philosophy:
A Study of Saint Thomas's Commentary on the Eight Books ofAήstotle s Physics (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1945), pp. 15-18; and William A. Wallace, "St. Thomas and the Pull of
Gravity," in From a Realist Point of View: Essays on the Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed.
(Lanham, Md., 1983), pp. 147-69, at 161 and n. 49; reprinted from The McAuley
Lectures 1963: Science and the Liberal Concept (West Hartford, Conn., 1964), pp.
143-65. WeisheipΓs account has its echoes in, for example, Sheilah O'Flynn Bren-
nan, "ΦYΣIΣ: The Meaning of 'Nature' in the Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature,"
in The Dignity of Science: Studies in the Philosophy of Science Presented to William Humbert
Kane, O.P, ed. J. Weisheipl (River Forest, 111., 1961), pp. 247-65, at 251-55; Antonio
Moreno, "The Law of Inertia and the Principle Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur," The
Thomist 38 (1974): 306-31, at 320-25.
4. See, for example, Etienne Gilson: "For a scholastic philosopher, as a matter of
fact, physical bodies are endowed with forms from which they derive their movement
and their properties; and . . . [form is a] genus which includes both the forms of
inorganic beings and the forms or souls of organized beings. This explains the
relative sterility of the scholastic philosophy in the order of physics and even chemis-
try Three centuries spent in classing what must be measured ... produced only a
kind of pseudo-physics, as dangerous to the future of science as to that of the philoso-
phy which imagined itself bound to it." Gilson continues, "There is then no question
of denying the hylomorphism of inorganic beings, but what does seem necessary is a
radical severance of the idea of organic form from the idea of inorganic form . . . . be-
tween the Cartesian artificialism which makes animals into so many machines, and
the Aristotelian vitalism which makes physical bodies into so many animals, there
must be room for a mechanism in physics and a vitalism in biology. Every 'nature' re-
quires a formal principle, but not every form is living. Inorganic form is a principle of
structure and of arrangement of energies, but not a source of energy which is calcula-
ble, or experimentally demonstrable, nor an inner spontaneity giving rise to observ-
able quantitative variations"; "Concerning Christian Philosophy: The Distinctiveness
of the Philosophical Order," in Philosophy and History: The Ernst CassirerFestschήft, ed.
R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton (New York, 1963), pp. 61-76, at 72-74; this is D. A. Pa-
ton's translation of Lerealismemethodique (Paris, 1936), c. 3.
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to another, Aristotle's view that a substance's nature is the mover or effi-
cient cause of its own motions is symptomatic of the major impediment
to the development of the principle of inertia and of modern science; it
is symptomatic, that is, of Aristotle's principle that 'everything moved is
moved by another' (henceforth OQM, for omne quod movetur ab alio
movetur) .5 For if a falling boulder has no external cause that is pushing it
down, then the principle OQM seems to require that the boulder's own
substantial form or nature be its mover.6 Weisheipl has argued, on the
contrary, that this interpretation of nature, widespread in medieval scho-
lasticism, stems principally from Avicenna and Averroes. Aristotle, as well
as Aquinas following him, never meant by the principle OQM that every
motion requires the new causal operation of a distinct yet corporeally
adjoined motive force. Once this "specter of a conjoined mover" is ex-
posed, concluded Weisheipl, there is no inconsistency between an Aristo-
telian natural philosophy and the mathematical principle of inertia that
founds classical physics.7
Weisheipl's clarification of these matters constitutes a definitive ad-
vance for our grasp of the ancient and medieval philosophy of nature. At
the same time, as I maintain in part I below, Weisheipl's further conclusions
regarding the causeless character of natural motion lead to insoluble diffi-
culties for the interpreter of Aristotle and Aquinas. Here I draw attention
to these further conclusions, to the difficulties that they raise, and to their
ultimate source in Weisheipl's distinctive explication of Aquinas's concept
5. See, for example, Anneliese Maier: "Unfortunately, [Aristotle's] legacy, part
of which was received tacitly and part explicitly, included several principles whose
acceptance set a priori limits to all the efforts of late scholasticism that no indi-
vidual was able to surmount . . . . Two . . . fundamental assumptions were espe-
cially momentous and disastrous . . . . The second principle is the dictum omne
quod movetur ab aliquo movetur: every motion requires a particular mover that is
connected with it and is its direct cause." According to Maier, "This axiom also
pararalyzed a new concept of motion that contained an important new perspective
and might have made possible the discovery of the law of inertia if the Aristotelian
impediment had not been in the way. More precisely, the law of inertia would
have followed as a logical consequence from this new idea of motion if the con-
clusions derived from it had not been twisted to conform to the Aristotelian
rule"; On the Threshold of Exact Science: Selected Wήtings of Anneliese Maier on Late
Medieval Natural Philosophy, ed. S. Sargent (Philadelphia, 1982), pp. 148, 157-58;
translated from " Έrgebnisse' der spatscholastischen Naturphilosophie," Scholastίk
35 (1960): 161-88.
Cf. James Weisheipl, "The Principle Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in Medie-
val Physics," in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, ed. W. E. Carroll (Washington,
D.C., 1985), pp. 75-97, at 79-85; reprinted from Isis 56 (1965): 26-45.
6. See Anneliese Maier, An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft: die
Struktur der mateήellen Substanz, das Problem der Gravitation, die Mathematik der Form-
latituden, 2nd ed. (Rome, 1952), pp. 149-51.
7. See "The Relationship of Medieval Natural Philosophy to Modern Science:
The Contribution of Thomas Aquinas to Its Understanding," in Nature and Motion,
pp. 261-76, at 262-73; reprinted from Manuscήpta 20 (1976): 181-96.
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of nature. In part II, I reexamine Aquinas on nature to show how his
conception leads to an alternate explanation of nature's causal depend-
ence. The focus of my discussion, then, is on Aquinas, from whose text the
difficulties in question stem. My aim, however, is to bring out a conception
of nature that is in line with WeisheipΓs two main theses but that at the same
time avoids a naturalism foreign even to Aristotle himself.
I. WEISHEIPL'S CONCEPTION OF NATURE
A.
Three principal conclusions lead to the difficulties to which I refer. First,
Weisheipl concludes not only that natural motion, such as of the falling
boulder, needs no 'conjoined mover', as we have seen, but also that it,
properly speaking, needs no moving cause whatever. Consider the following
statements. Once a new natural "substance is generated," says Weisheipl,
"its formal principle no longer needs to be moved . . . it already has
everything it needs to do whatever comes naturally."8 Natural motion is
not explained, he says, "by the constant exerted efficiency of a mover, as
is often thought . . . once a particular body is in existence, there is no
need for an agent constantly acting upon it to account for its activity. The
body itself acts."9 And, again, "Once 'nature' as a formal, active principle
exists in a body there is no further mover {motor) needed to explain the
actus secundus of that nature. It immediately (statim) and spontaneously
moves to second act by its own formal power (virtus), already implanted
in the actus pήmus. No further efficient cause is needed to explain the
continued movement of the nature once it has left the womb of the gen-
erator (generans) . " 1 0
According to Weisheipl, then, the boulder falls down without being
moved by anything: it falls naturally or by nature and not because of the
constant causal influence of some agent. WeisheipΓs second principal con-
clusion is nothing but a consequence of the first: natural motion of this
kind, since it, properly speaking, has no moving cause, is exempt from
Aristotle's principle OQM. As Weisheipl puts it, the principle "is not ap-
8. "Principle Omne quod movetur," p. 92.
9. "The Concept of Nature," pp. 19-20, in Nature and Motion, pp. 1-24; re-
printed from The New Scholasticism 28 (1954): 377-408, and from Nature and Gravi-
tation (River Forest, 111., 1955), pp. 1-32.
10. "The Specter of motor coniunctus in Medieval Physics," p. 108, in Nature and
Motion, pp. 99-120; reprinted from Studi sul XTV secolo in memoήa di Anneliese Maier,
ed. A. Maierύ and A. P. Bagliani (Rome, 1981), pp. 81-104. "The substantial form
or 'nature' has the ability of itself (in virtute) to move immediately (statim) to the
goal intended by nature without the intervention of any other efficient cause,
except a removens prohibens, should that be necessary;" "Specter," p. 107.
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plicable to the movement from first act to second act. That is to say, it
has nothing to do with the continuation of natural motion once the for-
mal 'nature' exists."11 Thus, the principle OQM requires that the boulder
have neither a 'conjoined mover' in WeisheipΓs sense nor a mover of
any kind. For Weisheipl, the principle is simply inapplicable to the boul-
der's fall.
Why, we must ask, is natural motion exempt from the otherwise uni-
versal principle? WeisheipΓs answer constitutes the third principal con-
clusion: 'being moved' or moveή is very different from 'being in motion'
or in motuP- Unlike 'being in motion', the term 'being moved' is in the
passive voice and implies a cause, that is, something 'moving' in the active
voice.13 But, maintains Weisheipl, by no means are all things that are 'in
motion' being passively moved by some cause. The falling boulder is 'in
motion' but is not here and now 'being moved' by any cause.14 It follows
that such natural motion is not, properly speaking, an instance of 'being
moved' but only of 'being in motion'.15 The passive voice continues to
be found used of such motions only because of the limitations of the
classical languages.16 In English, Weisheipl prefers instead the active voice,
11. "Specter," p. 107. "A body in natural motion does not need other forces to
move it . . . the Aristotelian principle [omne quod movetur does not demand] . . .
that there be movers to account for [the] motion" ("Principle Omne quod movetur,"
p. 97). See also below, n. 35.
12. "Principle Omne quod movetur" pp. 78, 88, 95; cf. "Quidquid movetur ab alio
movetur; A Reply [to Nikolaus Lobkowicz]," The New Scholasticism 42 (1968):
422-31, at 422-23; "Specter," pp. 99-100, 107.
13. "Principle Omne quod movetur" pp.76-78; cf. "Specter," pp. 99-100.
14. According to Weisheipl, in "Quidquid movetur," p. 423, it is not obvious
that natural motions such as of free-falling objects are instances of being 'produced'
by something. Accordingly, Aristotle in Physics 8.4 had first to prove that such objects
are in some sense 'being moved' before he could affirm the principle OQM. Hence,
he argues that although they are not 'being moved' here and now, they were 'being
moved' in the past by their generator. As Weisheipl explains elsewhere, in such cases
it is true that everything that was moved was moved by another, and the principle
OQM applies in this sense ("Principle Omne quod movetur," p. 92). Movetur', then,
does not refer to the nature of falling bodies except insofar as it covers the original
generation of this nature (p. 95).
15. In "Principle Omne quod movetur, "pp. 96-97, Weisheipl distinguishes a body
that is 'moved', 'put into motion', 'kept in motion', or 'acted upon' from a body
that is 'in natural motion'; the former needs another force to move it, whereas the
latter does not.
16. Weisheipl proposes that Latin and Greek use the passive because the active
voice is transitive, suggesting a subject efficiently causing its own or another's
motion; by contrast, the passive voice is appropriate for a subject that lacks life,
self-dominion, and freedom, and that is ultimately caused by an original generator
or creator of which it is merely the instrument. "Specter," pp. 109, 112-13; "Princi-
ple Omne quod movetur," p. 92, n. 63; "Concept," p. 21; "Aristotle's Concept of
Nature: Avicenna and Aquinas," in Approaches to Nature in the Middle Ages: Papers of
the Tenth Annual Conference of the Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies
(Binghamton, N.Y., 1982), pp. 137-60, at 146, n. 29.
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speaking of the boulder's form as 'acting'17 or as 'moving'18 of itself to-
wards its goal.
This unique character of spontaneous natural motion explains why it
is not covered by Aristotle's principle OQM. As Weisheipl explains, the
principle means only that anything said 'to be moved' in the passive voice
requires something said 'to move it' in the active, transitive voice.19 To
interpret Aristotle's principle in this sense is to see it as self-evident.20
However, argues Weisheipl, to interpret omne quod movetur as extending
beyond the passive voice to absolutely everything said to be 'in motion' or
in motu is both "grammatically impossible and philosophically absurd."21
For him this interpretation overlooks the grammatical passive in movetur
and leads to a conjoined mover that pushes the boulder down, that is, to
the very specter that haunted medieval Aristotelianism.
These three conclusions drawn by Weisheipl constitute what I refer to
as the 'mover-less' or 'causeless' character of natural motion in his account.
It would be false to say that for him such motion has no efficient or agent
cause. God is the cause of the existence of all things, the first agent by which
all things act; and as the prior cause of each thing's nature, God can even
be called the 'mover' presupposed by every natural motion.22 Nevertheless,
17. "Aristotle's Concept," p. 146: "Experience alone can indicate whether
bodies act spontaneously or are being acted upon by an external force;" cf. p. 148
(quoted in n. 115). See also "Concept," p. 20 (quoted above at n. 9) and p. 16:
"there remains the fundamental spontaneity by which the body acts in its own right,
acts as itself."
18. "Concept," p. 12: "inasmuch as they [natural bodies] spontaneously move,
they have an 'active' principle; and inasmuch as they must be moved, they have the
'passive principle'." "Aristotle's Concept," p. 147: "But a non-living thing simply
moves of itself and not by itself. A stone simply falls to the ground . . . it does not
move itself to the ground." "Principle Omne quod movetur, p. 92: "In plain English we
can say that for St. Thomas the form [of a natural body] simply moves; it is not a
mover" "A body in natural motion does not need other forces to move it, since it
already has everything it needs to move in virtute primae agentis; it already has, for
Aristotle and many schoolmen, everything it needs even to accelerate naturally" (p.
97). See "Aristotle's Concept," p. 149; "Specter," p. 109; The Development of Physical
Theory in the Middle Ages (New York, 1959; Ann Arbor, Mich., 1971), p. 47; "Motion
in a Void: Aquinas and Averroes," in Nature and Motion, pp. 121-42, at 134; reprinted
from St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, ed. A. Maurer et al.
(Toronto, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 467-88; "The Concept of Nature: Avicenna and Aqui-
nas," in Thomistic Papers, vol. 1, ed. V. Brezik (Houston, 1984), pp. 65-82, at 72, 76.
See also the passages cited above, n. 10.
19. "Principle Omne quod movetur" pp. 76-78. A similar defense of Aristotle's
principle OQM is found in McWilliams, Physics and Philosophy, p. 15.
20. In his late articles, Weisheipl rejects the position that the principle OQM is
self-evidently known to the wise and needs no proper demonstration. See especially
"Aristotle's Concept," p. 159, n. 33; also "Specter," pp. 100-1; "Relationship," p. 269.
21. "Principle Omne quod movetur," p. 78; "Quidquid movetur," pp. 422-23;
"Specter," pp. 99-100, 107. Cf. "Concept," pp. 14-15, n. 61.
22. "Concept," pp. 14-15, n. 61: "Philosophically there is no need for a constant
physical mover to account for motion. . . . We are not here discussing nature
'inquantum agit in virtute Dei'. . . . That is a different question altogether. Thomas
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given the existence of nature, no further operation of a mover is required,
according to Weisheipl. Natural motion as such is mover-less. Otherwise, the
principle OQM could apply to it.
B.
WeisheipΓs conclusions regarding the causal independence of natural mo-
tion raise three difficulties, as I see it, for the interpretation of Aristotle and
Aquinas. First, both thinkers use 'to be moved' and 'to be in motion' inter-
changeably,23 and they nowhere appeal to a distinction between these terms
in establishing the principle OQM. In one place Aquinas even follows Aris-
totle in stating, "It is necessary that everything that is in motion is moved."24
acknowledges that 'non est contra rationem naturae [id est, ut principium activum]
quod motus naturalis sit a Deo sicut a primo movente.' Sum. theol. I—II, 6, 1 ad 3."
"Aristotle's Concept," p. 149: "And all of these [natural motions] must be brought
into existence in the first place hy another, the true efficient cause, which ultimately
is God, the First Mover." In addition to n. 14 above, cf. "Principle Omne quod
movetur," pp. 91, n. 61; 97.
23. Aquinas, in fact, rarely describes bodies as in motu. From the approximately
one thousand passages listed in the Index thomisticus, ed. R. Busa (Stuttgart/Bad
Cannstatt, 1974-1980), as containing the prepositional phrase in motu, I have found
only twenty-four in which Thomas himself uses the phrase as an adjectival modifier
as opposed to an adverbial modifier (not including nine instances in objections or
deletions). In five passages (four others in objections), Thomas uses in motu inter-
changeably with a passive form of moveή or mutaή. In addition to the quotation in
the following note, see In octo libros Physicorum Aήstotelis expositio, ed. P. M. Maggiόlo
(Turin/Rome, 1950), 6.6, 1. 8, nn. 1-3 (826-28); In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum
Aήstotelis expositio, ed. M.-R. Cathala and R. Spiazzi (Turin/Rome, 1950), 4.5, 1. 12,
n. 683; 11.6,1. 6, nn. 2238, 2240; In Aήstotelis libros De caelo et mundo, De generatione et
corruptione, Meteorologicorum expositio, ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin/Rome, 1952), 2.8, 1. 12,
n. 4 (405). In twelve other passages, Thomas uses ea quae sunt in motu, or the
equivalent, to refer to all things moved in nature; Super Boetium De tήnitateb.2 caput,
ob 1, 5, 6, 7, sc 2, c, 11. 73-77, in Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia: iussu impensaque
Leonis XIIIP.M. edita (Rome, 1882-), vol. 50; In Met. 1.9,1. 15, n. 226; 3.4 (999b4-5),
1. 9, n. 449; 4.5,1. 13, nn. 689-90; 7.15,1. 15, n. 1606; 8.1,1. 1, n. 1686; 9.1,1. 1, nn.
1770-71; 11.1 (1059a36-38), 1. 1, nn. 2156, 2163; 12.1,1. 2, n. 2427.
Out of twenty-one passages containing έv Kivήσεi in Aristotle's authentic
works, thirteen use the phrase as an adjectival modifier. In three of these the phrase
is used interchangeably with a passive form of Kivεΐσθαi Aήstotelis Physica, ed. W.
D. Ross (Oxford, 1950), 4.12 (221b7-12); Aήstotelis Metaphysica, ed. W.Jaeger
(Oxford, 1957), Δ.14 (1020bl7-22); De anima, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1956), 1.2
(405a27-29). Two others use the phrase of all things moved, in language repeated
by Aquinas; Met. B.4 (999b4-5); K.1 (1059a36-38).
24. "Quia enim tempus est mensura motus, posset aliquis credere quod quies-
cens, quia non est in motu, non sit in tempore. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum dicit
[Aristoteles], quod non est necesse moveri omne quod est in tempore, sicut necesse
est moveή omne quod est in motu: quia tempus non est motus, sed numerus motus.
Contingit autem esse in numero motus non solum quod movetur, sed etiam quod
quiescit;" In Phys. 4.12 (221b7-12), 1. 20, n. 8 (607). All translations and emphases
therein are my own.
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Second, both thinkers deem it necessary to find Ά proof oϊ the principle OQM
as applying to all bodies, including the heavy and light.25 In fact, Aquinas
discovers in the wording of Physics 8 A a new demonstration of the principle
OQM, which, he expressly says, applies also to the difficult case of natural
gravity and levity.26 Third, and most important, if Weisheipl is correct, then
Aristotle's proof of a prime mover is inconclusive—as is Aquinas's own 'first
way', at least insofar as it follows Aristotle. Aristotle's proof leads from things
"being moved" to a first mover not 'being moved',27 but in WeisheipΓs ac-
count, this first mover may still be 'in motion' simply by its own nature.
Therefore, this first mover could be a heavenly body, for example, perpetu-
ally 'in motion' of itself.28 As a result, the Aristotelian proof would fail to
arrive at a motionless mover, let alone at a first being.
C.
My concern in this article is not to prove that these difficulties invalidate
WeisheipΓs three conclusions. Instead, I wish to disclose the conception of
nature that caused these difficulties, then to propose a way to amend it.
What governs WeisheipΓs exposition of natural philosophy is his in-
sight that Aristotle means by 'nature' an intrinsic source of dynamism and
spontaneity in the cosmos.29 Nature, of course, has other roles, as when
wood by nature is burned by fire, and when lions by nature move themselves
toward their prey. Nevertheless, insists Weisheipl, nature is not always either
simply static, awaiting its actualization by an extrinsic agent, or radically
self-moving, efficiently causing its own actualization, as in the case of ani-
mals. Nature, in other words, is not always either simply passive or 'active'
in the sense of an efficient cause. Instead, just as there is no other source
25. For Weisheipl, whether a given motion requires a mover or not is known
ultimately only through experience; cf. "Concept," pp. 12-13; "Aristotle's Concept,"
p. 146, quoted in n. 17.
26. InPhys. 8.4, 1. 8, nn. 1-2 (1029-1030). I have discussed this demonstration
in pp. 247-49 of "Why Motion Requires a Cause: The Foundation for a Prime Mover
in Aristotle and Aquinas," in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of
fames A. Weisheipl O.P, ed.J. Long (Toronto, 1991), pp. 235-54.
27. Weisheipl himself admits that for the argument from motion to arrive at
God as unmoved, non movetur must include 'not brought into being' and 'not
intellectually moved' ("Principle Omne quod movetur," p. 95). In other words, the
argument cannot be restricted only to certain motions.
28. Cf. Bechler's refutation in Aήstotles Theory, p. 47: Ήence the cosmic chain
of mover-moved breaks down at each case of continuous natural motion, that is,. .
. already at the first sphere of fixed stars, and then at each of the next spheres of
the planets, and then at each case of a free fall or free-ascent of any element."
Similarly, Francisco Suarez criticized the physical proof of God's existence, object-
ing to the principle OQM, as had John Duns Scotus: the principle does not lead
beyond a celestial body moved by its own form. Disputationes metaphysicae 29.1, n. 7,
in Opera omnia (Paris, 1856-1877), vol. 26, p. 23.
29. See "Concept," pp. 9-10, 23.
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of a rose's being red than its nature, so there is no other source of a heart's
beating or of fire's rising than its own nature. Such a source of spontaneous
change, Weisheipl maintains, is the proper and strict sense of the term
defined by Aristotle as an 'intrinsic principle or cause of motion or rest'.30
In this definition's distinction between a principle and a cause, in fact,
Weisheipl discovers the basis for differentiating the dynamic sense of nature
from other secondary senses of the term.31 Just as a point is the principle
but not the cause of a line, so the boulder's nature is the principle but not
the cause of its fall. According to Weisheipl, motion 'springs' or 'flows'
inevitably from this principle, without the boulder's nature efficiently caus-
ing or moving itself down. In some secondary senses, Weisheipl admits,
'nature' does refer to an efficient cause, whether extrinsic, as when water's
nature cools air, or intrinsic, as when one part of the lion moves another
part forward. But in efficient causality, an effect is really dependent on a
really distinct causal entity. Thus, were the boulder's nature an efficient
cause, a boulder would be indistinguishable from a self-moving animal.
Precisely by overlooking this crucial distinction between a cause and a
principle, argues Weisheipl, the Arabs and their Latin successors distorted
Aristotle's philosophy of nature with the doctrine of the substantial form as
a mover of inanimate bodies.32
Another distinction, drawn by Aquinas, helps Weisheipl to elucidate his
conception of 'nature' as a dynamic principle.33 Aquinas holds that nature
as an intrinsic principle of motion has two senses: first, passive or material;
second, active or formal. Nature that is passive or material, on the one
hand, refers to a body's characteristic "receptivity for [certain] external
influences," as Weisheipl aptly puts it.34 Such a principle always requires a
distinct agent, as when wood, naturally combustible, is burned, or when the
celestial bodies in the Aristotelian cosmos are moved. For Weisheipl, the
principle OQM applies to all and only those natural motions that arise from
nature in this passive sense.35 Nature that is active and formal, on the other
hand, refers to an 'internal spontaneity' for motion as opposed to a recep-
tivity. Such a principle, properly speaking, needs no mover in WeisheipΓs
reading. The heart's beating and fire's rising have no per se efficient cause
except whatever originally generated these bodies, giving them their sub-
30. "Concept," p. 16.
31. "Specter," pp. 103-4; cf. "Aristotle's Concept," pp. 146-48; "Concept," pp.
18, 20-21.
32. "Specter," pp. 100, 105, 118-20; "Principle Omne quod movetur," p. 96.
33. See "Concept," pp. 9-21.
34. "Concept," p. 10.
35. "Concept," p. 14, n. 61: "The point is that this axiom [OQM] applies only
to nature as a passive principle." Cf. "Principle Omne quod movetur/' p. 95: "It should
be clear that for St. Thomas movetur refers exclusively to nature as a passive and
material principle of motion and rest. It does not refer to nature as an active and
formal principle of motion and rest, except in the sense that it too had 'to be
moved,' generated, produced in the first place."
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stantial form or nature; because unless something impedes, such spontane-
ous motions follow immediately and necessarily from a thing's form as an
active and formal principle. Consequently, Weisheipl can conclude, as we
have seen, that motions proceeding from nature as active are not covered
by the principle OQM and are better described with the active rather than
with the passive voice. In such cases, nature is not 'being moved' by any-
thing. Instead, independently of any moving cause, it spontaneously comes
to be and then continues to be 'in motion'—'acting' or 'moving of itself.
II. AQUINAS'S CONCEPTION OF NATURE
Precisely this conception of a 'causeless' natural motion has led to the three
difficulties already raised above. To one who follows WeisheipΓs account,
such a conception seems to be derived directly from the text of Aquinas.
Nevertheless, I argue that Aquinas's meaning has been missed because the
central texts have been read separately from the philosophical principles
that animate them. As a corrective, I present in what follows six principal
elements of Aquinas's doctrine on nature: (A) nature as a thing's principle
of motion is distinct from a thing's substantial 'nature', form and matter;
(B) nature as a principle of motion is a passive potency; (C) such nature is
divided into 'active' and 'formal' versus 'passive' and 'material'; (D) nature
as active is an accidental quality that is, nevertheless, in passive potency to
further act; (E) all passive potencies require agents for their actualization;
(F) all natural motions are continuously caused by a mover found even
within the natural world.
These elements together establish that there is no 'causeless' natural
motion for Aquinas. Specifically, they establish, contrary to Weisheipl, that
nature as an active principle of motion nevertheless requires a distinct
mover; that, for Aquinas, the falling boulder is being moved; and that it
requires the constant exertion of an efficient cause that moves it down.
A.
The first element regards the meaning of 'nature': it is necessary to distin-
guish clearly between nature as a principle of motion and nature as a thing's
substantial matter or form. The more this distinction is lost sight of, the
more nature's dependence on a cause will be overlooked. The distinction
is evident in Aristotle's list, in Metaphysics Δ.4, of six different senses of
φύσiς: (1) the becoming of what grows; (2) the first element out of which
it grows; (3) 'that from which is the first motion' in any natural thing; (4)
the matter out of which a natural thing comes to be and exists; (5) the form
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of a natural thing; (6) any oύσία. According to Aristotle here, the primary
sense of 'nature' is the fifth sense and not the third.3 6
Aquinas frequently recounts essentially the same list and understands
the order to be intentional, a chronology of the extended senses of one
term 'nature'. 3 7 The account of the Sentences commentary is typical:
But nature receives its name from being born (nascendo), which is,
properly speaking, the generation of living things that produce like
from like in species. Hence, 'nature' when first introduced signified the
very generation of living things, namely, their 'nativity'. Additionally,
the name 'nature' was transferred to signify the active principle of this
generation, because powers that act are customarily named from their
actions. From there the name 'nature' further came to signify the active
principle of any natural motion; and further [came] to signify also the
material principle of any generation; and, from there also [came] to
signify the formal principle, which is the terminus of generation. But
because generation terminates not only at form but also at a composite
substance, for this reason [the name 'nature'] was transferred to signify
any substance, according to what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5,
and to signify also any being, as Boethius says.38
As a result of this interpretation, Aquinas regards the primary sense of
the term, namely, 'nature' as corporeal form, to be not only distinct from
but also derived from 'nature' as a principle of motion. For 'nature' re-
ferred first to 'nativity' or the generation of living things (1), then to
the source of that generation (2). Next, since such a source is intrinsic,
explains the Summa theologiae, 'nature' came to mean the inner source
of any motion.3 9 Then, since 'nature' as a principle of motion (3) is either
36. Met. Δ.4 (1015al3-19).
37. In addition to the passages cited in the following four notes, see In Met. 5.4,
1. 5, nn. 824-26, 808-22.
38. Scήptum super libros Sententiarum, ed. P. Mandonnet and M. Moos (Paris,
1929-1947), 3.5.1.2: "natura autem a nascendo nomen accepit, quae proprie dicitur
generatio viventium ex similibus similia in specie producentium. Unde secundum
primam sui institutionem natura significant generationem ipsam viventium, scilicet
nativitatem. Item translatum est nomen naturae ad significandum principium acti-
vum illius generationis, quia virtutes agentes ex actibus nominari consueverunt.
Inde ulterius processit nomen naturae ad significandum principium activum cu-
juslibet motus naturalis. Et ulterius ad significandum etiam principium materiale
cujuslibet generationis. Et inde etiam ad significandum principium formale, quod
est terminus generationis. Sed quia generatio non solum terminatur ad formam,
sed ad substantiam compositam; ideo translatum est ad significandum quamlibet
substantiam, secundum quod dicit philosophus in 5 Metaphysicorum, et ad signifi-
candum etiam quodlibet ens, sicut dicit Boetius."
39. Summa theologiae (Ottawa, 1953), 1.29.1 ad 4; De unione verbi incarnati lc, in
S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2, ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin/Rome,
1953). See In Met. 5.4,1. 5, n. 815: "quod nascitur semper est coniunctum ei ex quo
nascitur. Ideo natura numquam dicit principium extrinsecum, sed secundum om-
nes suas acceptiones dicit principium intrinsecum."
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material or formal, 'nature' came to refer to a thing's substantial princi-
ples, to matter (4) or to form (5).40 For this reason, explains Aquinas
elsewhere, immediately after Aristotle defines 'nature' as a principle of
motion in Physics 2.1, he proceeds to divide 'nature' into matter and
form.41 In other words, for Thomas, the discussion of the third sense of
'nature' in the Physics occasions the discussion of the distinct fourth and
fifth senses.
B.
If nature as a principle and cause of motion is not substantial matter or
form, what is it? Principles and causes are obviously distinct from that of
which they are the principles and causes. Hence, nature in the relevant
sense is distinct from motion. And since motion is a sort of act of a subject,
nature is that in a subject because of which the subject has a characteristic
act. Nature, that is, is a kind of potency for act. The second element of
Aquinas's doctrine on nature, therefore, regards nature as a kind of po-
tency.
In a revealing passage in Metaphysics Θ.8, Aristotle, and Aquinas follow-
ing him, expressly places nature in the same genus as active potency—while
also denying that nature is an active potency.42 But what genus is common
to nature and active potency? The answer lies in Metaphysics Δ.12's discus-
sion of the meaning of'potency'. Δύvαμiς, in each of its two main senses, is
classified, like nature, as a 'principle of motion'. Aristotle defines an 'active
40. Έt quia huiusmodi generatio est a principio intrinseco, extensum est hoc
nomen ad significandum 'principium intrinsecum cuiuscumque motus.' Et sic
definitur natura in 2 Physicorum. Et quia huiusmodi principium est formale vel
materiale, communiter tarn materia quam forma dicitur natura" (ST 1.29.1 ad 4).
See also Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium, seu Summa contra
gentiles, ed. C. Pera et al. (Turin/Rome, 1961), 4.35 (Amplius. Nomen naturae): "Et
quia huiusmodi principium [id est, principium motus intrinsecum mobili] est
materia vel forma, ulterius natura dicitur forma vel materia rei naturalis habentis
in se principium motus." Cf. In Met. 5.4,1. 5, nn. 816, 819.
41. SN 3.3.2.1 ad 6: "cujuslibet motus naturalis principium est in eo quod
movetur, non tamen eodem modo, ut in 2 Physicorum dicit Commentator. In quibus-
dam enim est principium activum, ut in motu gravium et levium; in quibusdam vero
principium passivum, ut in generatione simplicium corporum. Unde et Philoso-
phus naturam, quam principium motus in eo quod movetur definit, statim subdi-
vidit in materiam et formam." Cf. SN 2.18.1.2 and In Met 7.9,1. 8, n. 1442ζ (quoted
in nn. 51 and 53).
42. In Met. 9.8 (1049b6-10), 1.7, nn. 1844-55: "quia et natura ad idem perti-
nere videtur quod potentia [id est, activa]. Est enim natura in eodem genere cum
potentia ipsa, quia utrumque est principium motus, licet natura non sit principium
motus in alio, sed in eo in quo est, inquantum huiusmodi." Cf. the opposition
between δύvαμiς (active potency) and φύσiς in Aristotle, De caelo, ed. D. J. Allan
(Oxford, 1936), 3.2 (301bl8-20).
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potency' as a 'principle of motion in another', whereas a 'passive potency'
is a 'principle of motion by another'.43 Nature and potency, then, as princi-
ples of motion, are in the same genus.
At the same time, Aristotle's denial that nature is an active potency
leaves nature to be aligned only with passive potency. The reason for this
denial is clear given Aristotle's explanation of active and passive potency.
Recall the definition of 'nature' in the Physics: 'a principle and cause of
being moved and of resting in that to which it belongs primarily and per se'.44
An active potency, however, Aristotle explains, is a principle of motion that
is in something other than the thing that is moved, or that is in the thing qua
other (that is, in one part and not in the whole 'primarily'). This principle
is what causes another thing's motion, as the sculptor's art effects the statue.
In fact, active δύvαμiς, the primary sense of the term for Aristotle, would be
best rendered in English as active 'power' so as to refer to the extrinsic
principle that is actualizing rather than to the intrinsic 'potency' that is
being actualized. By contrast, passive potency is the principle in the thing
moved, the principle actualized or effected by another, like the marble's
potency to be sculptured. It is easy to see, then, why 'nature', a principle of
motion intrinsic to a thing, is classed with passive potency rather than with
active power. Indeed, nature, as belonging to a thing primarily and per se,
is a particular kind of intrinsic principle of motion, or passive potency.
That Aquinas agrees with this account of the relation between nature
and passive potency is clear from his exposition of Metaphysics Δ .12 on active
power—an important text:
[Aristotle] therefore sets forth four modes of 'potency' or 'power'.
The first of these is that potency is said to be a principle of motion or
change in another insofar as it is other. For, there is a certain principle
of motion or change in that which is changed: namely, matter itself; or
some formal principle from which motion results, just as upward or
downward motion follows upon the form of that which is heavy or light.
But such a principle cannot be called an active potency [that produces]
this motion. For, everything moved is moved by another. And, some-
thing does not move itself except through parts insofar as one part
moves another, as is proved in Physics 8. Therefore, nature according as
it is the principle of motion in that in which it exists is not grasped as
an active potency but rather as passive. For, heaviness in earth is not a
principle for moving but rather for being moved. Therefore, the active
potency of motion must be in something other than that which is
moved, just as the power of building is not in the thing built but rather
in the builder.45
43. Met. Δ.12 (1019al5-20). For the terms 'active' and 'passive' potency, see
Met.ΔΛ5 (1021al4-18).
44. Aristotle, Phys. 2.1 (192b21-22).
45. In Met. 5.12,1. 14, n. 955 (corrections to the Latin text are from Weisheipl,
"Concept," p. 19, n. 78): "Ponit ergo [Aristoteles] . . . quattuor modos potentiae
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The principle of motion that is in what is moved, whether it be matter or a
formal principle, cannot be called an 'active power', explains Thomas,46
because an active power must be other than what it moves, even in the case
of self-motion. Therefore, he infers, as a principle of motion in a thing,
nature is grasped not under the notion of active power but rather under
that of passive potency: non comprehenditur sub potentia activa, sed magis sub
passiva. The heaviness, for example, which is soil's 'nature', is not a princi-
ple that actively moves soil down (pήncipium ut moveat) but is the principle
whereby soil is passively moved always in the same direction (pήncipium ut
moveatur). For Aquinas it is clear, then, that nature is a kind of passive
potency of the boulder for falling.
From the first two elements of Aquinas's doctrine it follows that nature
is a passive potency for motion and, as such, is distinct from substantial
matter or form. The reason is that nature, insofar as it is a principle of a
motion distinct from or accidental to a thing's substance, must itself be
nonsubstantial since potency and act lie in the same genus.47 Furthermore,
nature in this sense is common to many bodies that nevertheless differ in
their substantial form.48 Given these two elements, then, the third element
can now be understood, namely, Aquinas's distinction between nature as an
active or formal principle of motion and nature as a passive or material
principle.
vel potestatis. Quorum primus est, quod potentia dicitur principium motus et
mutationis in alio inquantum est aliud. Est enim quoddam principium motus vel
mutationis in eo quod mutatur, ipsa scilicet materia: vel aliquod principium for-
male, ad quod consequitur motus, sicut ad formam gravis vel levis sequitur motus
sursum aut deorsum. Sed huίusmodi principium non potest dici potentia activa, ad
quam pertinet motus ille. Omne enim quod movetur ab alio movetur. Neque
aliquid movet seipsum nisi per partes, inquantum una pars eius movet aliam, ut
probatur in octavo Physicorum. Natura igitur, secundum quod est principium motus
in eo in quo est, non comprehenditur sub potentia activa, sed magis sub passiva.
Gravitas enim in terra non est principium ut moveat, sed magis ut moveatur.
Potentia igitur activa motus oportet quod sit in alio ab eo quod movetur, sicut
aedificativa potestas non est in aedificato, sed magis in aedificante."
46. Note that nature as a principle of motion, precisely as an ίntήnsic principle,
is never, for Aquinas, the efficient cause of self-motion (namely, soul) or of the
natural motion in other bodies. For Weisheipl, by contrast, 'nature' sometimes
refers to such efficient causes. See, for example, "The Concept of Nature: Avicenna
and Aquinas," p. 71, which contradicts, however, p. 69; see also Joseph Gredt,
Elementa philosophiae aήstotelico-ίhomisticae, 10th ed. (Freiburg, 1953), vol. 1, p. 225.
Furthermore, since for Thomas, unlike for Weisheipl ("Specter," pp. 104-5), there
is self-motion not only with respect to place but also with respect to quantity and
quality, growth is caused not by nature as an active principle but by soul. See
Quaestiones disputatae de veήtate 22.3c, in Opera omnia, vol. 22; In Met. 7.8, 1. 8, n.
1442ε; contra "Specter," p. 108; but cf. "Concept," p. 18.
47. For this argument, see ST 1.77.1c and 1.59.2c (quoted in n. 98). By the
same reasoning, nature as an intrinsic principle of substantial change would be one
with a thing's matter, although the natural alterations that lead up to natural
generations and corruptions require an accidental principle.
48. For this argument, see SN 1.14.1.5 ad 2 (quoted in n. 99).
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c.
In more than ten passages,49 Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of natural
motion: 'that which proceeds from a formal or active principle' and 'that
which proceeds from a material or passive/receptive principle'.5 0 In the
earliest text that presents this distinction, from the Sentences commentary,51
Aquinas traces it to two texts of Averroes.52 This origin is both revealing
and ironic. On the one hand, Aquinas finds in Averroes an apt defense,
alluded to in the Commentator's discussion of 'nature' as it applies to
49. The passages are listed with the note in which they may be found: SN
2.18.1.2c [n. 51]; 3.3.2.1 ad 6 [n. 41]; 3.22.3.2 sol. 1 [n. 54]; 4.43.1.3 [n. 50]; Dever.
12.3c [n. 64]; CG 3.23 (Amplius. Si) [n. 58]; (Non tamen) [n. 63]; (Hoc autem)
[n. 66]; 4.97 (Non debet) [n. 86]; Depot. 5.5c [n. 75]; CT 1.171 [n. 70]; ST 1.70.3
ad 4; 1-2.6.5 ad 2 [n. 74]; InPhys. 2.1,1. 1, n. 4 (144) [n. 76]; In Met. 5.12,1. 14, n.
955 [n. 45]; 7.9,1. 8, n. 1442ζ [n. 53]; InDe caelo 1.3,1. 6, n. 13 (70) [n. 69]; 3.2,1.
7, n. 5 (590) [n. 62].
50. This is Aquinas's most usual way of presenting the distinction. Pace
Weisheipl ("Concept," p. 12; cf. "Specter," p. 105; see below, n. 114), Aquinas does
not refer to this distinction through the terminology 'nature as form' versus 'nature
as matter' {natura secundum mateήam); in fact, such terminology confuses his
thought, as we shall see. By contrast, WeisheipΓs terms 'nature as an active princi-
ple' versus 'nature as a passive principle', although also not found in Thomas, do
accurately describe Thomas's distinction. See SN 4.43.1.3 (ST 3.75.3): "Natura enim
est principium motus in eo in quo est, vel activum, ut patet in motu gravium et
levium, et in alterationibus naturalibus animalium; vel passivum, ut patet in genera-
tione simplicium corporum. Passivum autem principium naturalis generationis est
potentia passiva naturalis, quae semper habet aliquam potentiam activam sibi re-
spondentem in natura, ut dicitur in 9 Metaphysicorum."
51. SN 2.18.1.2c: "Non enim eodem modo omnes motus naturales dicuntur, ut
in 2 Physicorum et in 1 Caeli et mundi Commentator dicit; sed quidam propter
principium activum intus existens, ut motus localis gravium et levium; et quidam
propter principium passivum quod est secundum potentiam ab agente naturali
natam in actum educi, ut in generatione et alteratione simplicium corporum: unde
et natura dividitur in materiam et formam." See SN 3.3.2.1 ad 6 (quoted in n. 41).
52. Averroes explains that when the Physics affirms a principle of motion within
things changed not only through locomotion and growth but also through 'altera-
tion' (including generation and corruption), Aristotle uses the term 'principle'
equivocally. Only in the case of locomotion are there simple bodies, not composed
of soul, that are moved of themselves. Hence, the intrinsic principle by which simple
bodies are 'altered' is matter, whereas the intrinsic principle by which composites
of body and soul are 'altered' is form: "Quoniam ίllud principium, quod est in
compositis, est secundum formam, et in simplicibus est secundum /¥/ materiam.
Sed hoc nomen principium usitatur hie aequivoce pro materia, et forma." In libros
Physicorum Aήstotelis 2.1 (192b 13-15), t. 1, f. 48E-F, in Averrois commentaήa et intro-
ductiones in omnes libros Aήstotelis cum eorum versione latina (Venice, 1562-1574), vol.
4. On this equivocity, see also f. 48D; t. 3, f. 491.
Averroes also distinguishes equivocal uses of 'nature' as applied to the body
and 'form' of the heavens: "Non est ergo intelligendum hoc, quod dicitur quod
natura in corpore caelesti est causa motus esse formam. Forma enim abstracta non
significat naturam corporis: neque in corpore caelesti est forma naturalis, quae sit
causa motus ipsius . . . forte intelligendum est in hoc loco de natura, quae est causa
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matter, of the naturalness of such changes as birth and death,53 or of
the heavens' rotation—despite the heavens' being caused by spiritual mov-
ers.
54
 On the other hand, according to Averroes's doctrine of 'nature' as
applying to form, the mover of falling bodies is their form.55 On this
point, of course, Aquinas disagrees with Averroes, as early as the Sentences
motus, subiectum simplex formae abstractae corporis /¥/ caelestis: et hoc ipsum
corpus non habet in se formam corporalem. . . . Secundum hoc igitur possumus
intelligere hoc nomen natura, quae dicitur de corpore caelesti, et de aliis corpori-
bus simplicibus, gravibus, scilicet, et levibus: et erit hoc aequivoce. /G/ Aut dicemus
quod formae abstractae, secundum quod sunt formae abstractae, innatae sunt ut
quod illud, quod ab eis movetur, sit corpus, neque grave, neque leve, sicut innatae
sunt ut motum ab eis sit rotundum, et sicut innata est forma ignis ut habeat
materiam propriam. Dicitur igitur hoc nomen natura secundum hoc de forma,
sicut dicitur de formis aliorum corporum simplicium." InDe caelo 1.2 (268bl3-17)
t. 5, f. 5E-G, in Averrois commentaήa, vol. 5.
53. Thomas, arguing against a doctrine of inchoate forms, concludes, "Non
tamen sequitur quod generatio inanimatorum corporum non sit naturalis. Non
enim oportet ad motum naturalem, quod semper principium motus, quod est in
mobili, sit principium activum et formale; sed quandoque est passivum et materiale.
Unde et natura in secundo Physίcorum distinguitur per materiam et formam. Et ab
hoc principio dicitur naturalis generatio simplicium corporum, ut dicit Commen-
tator in secundo Physicorum." In Met. 7.9, 1. 8, n. 1442ζ. Cf. also De potentia 5.7, in
Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2: Έt ab hoc [passivo] principio generatio et corruptio
in elementis sunt motus vel mutationes naturales; et non propter principium
activum ut dicit Commentator."
54. SN 2.14.1.3 ad 1: "sicut Commentator dicit in 1 Caeli et mundi, motus caeli
dicitur naturalis, non quia principium eius activum sit aliqua forma naturalis, sed
quia ipsum corpus caeleste est talis naturae ut talem motum natum suscipere ab
aliquo intellectu. . . . Natura enim non tantum dicitur de forma, sed etiam de
materia." See SN 3.22.3.2 sol. 1: "Natura autem dicitur dupliciter: scilicet de forma
quae est principium activum motus et de materia quae est principium passivum.
Secundum hoc igitur dupliciter dicitur aliquis motus naturalis. Uno modo quia in
ipso quod movetur est principium activum motus; et sic corpora gravia et levia
moventur naturaliter. Alio modo quia in eo quod movetur est dispositio naturalis
per quam aliquid est mobile ab aliquo movente; et hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia
vel est ista aptitudo ad hoc quod moveatur ab illo movente cum inclinatione ad
contrarium motum, sicut est in corpore animalis; et tune motus ille dicitur violentus
quantum ad naturam corporis, inquantum est corpus; naturalis autem quantum ad
naturam corporis, inquantum est animatum, ut dicit Philosophus in 8 Physicorum.
Aut non est aptitudo ad contrarium inclinans, sicut patet in motu corporum
caelestium, quae moventur a substantia separata, et tamen dicuntur moveri natu-
raliter, ut dicit Commentator in 1 Caeli et mundi." See also SN 4.48.2.2 ad 10 (ST
3.91.2): "motus caeli non dicitur naturalis . . . hoc modo quod habeat principium
activum in natura corporis, sed receptivum tantum; principium autem activum ejus
est in substantia spirituali, ut dicit Commentator in principio Caeli."
55. See Averroes, In De caelo 3.2, t. 28, ff. 198K-99A, especially K: "Lapis enim
movet se, inquantum est gravis in actu, et movetur inquantum est potentia inferius.
. . . Forma igitur eius movet, inquantum est forma, et movetur, secundum quod est
in materia;" 4.3, t. 22, f. 249C-E, especially D: "Gravitas enim in lapide est motor,
secundum quod est forma tantum, et ipsa est mota, inquantum est in prima
materia." For Averroes, the simple elements are self-moved, although only acciden-
tally, by their form's moving the medium; their only per se mover is their generator.
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commentary5 6 and later even by name. 5 7 In the Contra gentiles58 and there-
after, in fact, Aquinas uses his own doctrine of nature as a formal prin-
ciple—a doctrine apparently not found even in Albert59—precisely to
establish an alternative to Averroes. Out of Averroes's own words, there-
fore, Aquinas has apparently developed an original distinction, namely,
between formal and material nature, to counter not only an Άugustinian'
doctrine of inchoate forms60 but also an Averroean doctrine of self-moving
elements.
Aquinas's examples of natural motions help indicate the meaning of
his distinction. Active-formal nature lies behind the heavy's falling, the
56. SN 2.14.1.3c: "Quidam enίm dicunt quod sicut motus aliorum corporum
simplicium est ex naturis eorum corporalibus, ita etiam motus corporis caelestis.
Illud autem non videtur esse verum. . . . In motu autem corporum simplicium,
quamvis forma naturalis sit principium motus, non tamen est motor; sed essentίalis
motor est generans quod dedit formam, et accidentalis est removens prohibens."
57. See the full discussion of In De caelo3.2,1. 7, nn. 8-9 (593-94).
58. CG 3.23: "Amplius. Si principium motus caeli est sola natura, absque
apprehensione aliqua, oportet quod principium motus caeli sit forma caelestis
corporis, sicut et in dementis: licet enim formae simplices non sint moventes, sunt
tamen principia motuum, ad eas enim consequuntur motus naturales, sicut et
omnes aliae naturales proprietates. Non autem potest esse quod motus caelestis
sequatur formam caelestis corporis sicut principium activum. Sic enim forma est
principium motus localis, inquantum alicui corpori, secundum suam formam,
debetur aliquis locus, in quern movetur ex vi suae formae tendentis in locum ilium,
quam quia dat generans, dicitur esse motor: sicut igni secundum suam formam
competit esse sursum. Corpori autem caelesti, secundum suam formam, non magis
congruit unum ubi quam aliud. Non igitur motus caelestis principium est sola
natura."
59. For Weisheipl, Albert's doctrine of nature is identical to Thomas's ("Spec-
ter," pp. 108-10; cf. "Aristotle's Concept," p. 145; "Concept," p. 13). Yet, Albert, in
the loci classici of his Aristotelian paraphrases, Physica 2.1 or 8.4, does not propose
Aquinas's distinction between nature as a formal and as a material principle; in
Opera omnia, ed. Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense (Mύnster i. West, 1951-), vol.
4. On the contrary—pace Weisheipl, "Principle Omne quod movetur," p. 89, n. 50;
"The Interpretation of Aristotle's Physics and the Science of Motion," in The Cam-
bridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, andj . Pinborg
(Cambridge, 1982), pp. 521-36, at 528-29—Albert maintains that nature in the
sense of form, insofar as it is distinct from its subject, is an efficient principle of
motion and an active power {Physica 2.1.3, p. 81.72-76), that is, is a natural body's
proximate mover (p. 80.10-32). In fact, in his De caelo et mundo, Albert adopts the
essentially Averroean doctrine that although the prime mover of a heavy body is its
generator, its proximate mover is the accidental form of heaviness, which moves the
body down (in Opera omnia, vol. 5.1, 3.1.7, p. 218.52-95; 4.2.2, p. 259.31-39); as a
result, the whole body moves itself per accidens, as a sailor in a ship (4.2.1, p.
257.57-67; 4.2.2, p. 260.16-22). See below, n. 140. For the view of early Albert that
the substantial form moves fire upward, see De quattuor coaequaevis q. 16, a.l ad 1,
in Opera omnia, ed. Borgnet, vol. 34 (Paris, 1895), p. 439a; In Sententiarum libros
2.14.6c, p. 266a (Borgnet, vol. 27).
60. SN 2.18.1.2c; InPhys. 2.1,1. 1, nn. 3-4 (143-44); InMet. 7.9,1. 8, n. 1442α-ζ
(see above, n. 53). Aquinas would find Albert at least unclear on this matter. See
Bruno Nardi, "La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sulΓ inchoatio formae," in Studi di
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light's rising, the heart's beating, and iron's moving toward a magnet.61
Passive-material nature lies behind the heavenly bodies' rotating, terrestrial
bodies' being moved by the heavens,62 terrestrial bodies' being generated
by terrestrial causes,63 and living bodies' being moved by their souls.64 The
difference between these two classes of nature is best seen by comparing the
boulder's fall to celestial rotation. Every boulder, like every other heavy
body, falls in one direction: toward the earth's center. Each celestial body,
however, is moved in its own peculiar direction with its own peculiar veloc-
ity. Accordingly, Aquinas maintains that each celestial sphere requires a
filosofia medieυale (Rome, 1960), pp. 69-101; James Weisheipl, "The Axiom Opus
naturae est opus intelligentiae and Its Origins," in Albertus Magnus, Doctor universalis:
1280/1980, ed. G. Meyer and A. Zimmermann (Mainz, 1980), pp. 441-63, at
455-56.
61. De motu cordis, 11. 118-32, in Opera omnia, vol. 43. According to In Phys. 7.2,
1. 3, n. 7 (903), the magnet 'moves' iron by giving to it a new quality through which
it is moved to the magnet. In SN 4.43.1.3 (quoted in n. 50), Aquinas also traces
"natural alterations of animals" to nature as active. Among these he perhaps in-
cludes the spontaneous changes of temperature that accompany passions of the
soul and that, in turn, cause all the other nonvoluntary natural changes, such as in
an animal's heartbeat. Cf. De motu cordis, 11. 242-57, quoting Aristotle; see Aήstotle's
De motu animalium, ed. M. Nussbaum (Princeton, N.J., 1978), 11 (703b6-19).
62. In De caelo 3.2, 1. 7, n. 5 (590): "Est enim motus secundum naturam, cuius
principium est in ipso quod movetur: non solum autem principium activum, sed
etiam passivum, quod quidem est potentia per quam aliquid est naturaliter suscep-
tivum motionis alterius. Et ideo, cum corpora inferiora moventur a corporibus
superioribus, non est motus violentus, sed naturalis: quia in corporibus inferioribus
est naturalis aptitudo ut sequantur motiones superiorum corporum." See also CG
2.30 (Necessitas autem); ST 3.44.2 ad 1. For the natural motions of inferior orbs
carried by superior and for the tides affected by the moon's orbit, see SN 2.14.1.5
ad 4, and Depot. 4.1 ad 20.
63. CG 3.23 (Non tamen): "Non tamen est negandum motum caelestem esse
naturalem. Dicitur enim esse motus aliquis naturalis, non solum propter activum
principium, sed etiam propter passivum: sicut patet in generatione simplicium
corporum. Quae quidem non potest dici naturalis ratione principii activi: movetur
enim id naturaliter a principio activo cuius principium activum est intra, natura
enim est principium motus in eo in quo est; principium autem activum in genera-
tione simplicis corporis est extra. Non est igitur naturalis ratione principii activi, sed
solum ratione principii passivi, quod est materia, cui inest naturalis appetitus ad
for mam naturalem. Sic ergo motus caelestis corporis, quantum ad activum princi-
pium, non est naturalis, sed magis voluntarius et intellectualis: quantum vero ad
principium passivum est naturalis, nam corpus caeleste habet naturalem aptitudi-
nem ad talem motum." See also In Met. 7.7,1. 6, n. 1389, and the texts quoted above,
nn. 41, 50, 51, 53.
64. SN 3.22.3.2, sol. 1 (quoted above, n. 54); cf. In De caelo 1.2, 1. 3, n. 4 (22),
quoted in n. 130; De ver. 12.3c, 11. 200-10: "aliquid dicitur naturale dupliciter: uno
modo quia eius principium activum est natura, sicut naturale est igni ferri sursum;
alio modo quando natura est principium dispositionum ipsius, non quarumlibet,
sed earum quae sunt necessitas ad talem perfectionem, sicut dicitur quod infusio
animae rationalis est naturalis in quantum per operationem naturae corpus effϊci-
tur dispositum dispositione quae est necessitas ad animae susceptionem."
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special mover of its own imparting to it its peculiar motion.65 A boulder, by
contrast, given that it exists and that it is free of impediments, requires no
additional mover imparting to it its downward motion. The motions of the
boulder and of the heavens, then, although both natural, differ with respect
to their determinacy, as well as with respect to their causality.
Aquinas traces the difference between these two kinds of natural motion
to a difference in the intrinsic principle or 'nature' from which each motion
arises. He uses the terms 'formal' and 'active', versus 'material' and 'passive',
to describe the two different kinds of nature. Each term refers to both the de-
terminacy and the causality of the motion that stems from that natural princi-
ple. Thus, in the first place, 'material' or 'passive' refers to nature as an
indeterminate principle, whereas 'formal' or 'active' refers to nature as de-
terminate. The heavens are said to possess a 'material' principle of their con-
tinuous rotation because a celestial body is indifferently related to any one
particular place, says Thomas, just as prime matter is indifferently related to
any one substantial form.66 Similarly, the heavens' nature is called 'passive'
insofar as it is in potency to each and every place, since a thing is passive inso-
far as it is in potency.67 Such a principle is also described as 'susceptive',68
even of contraries.69 By contrast, the boulder is said to possess a 'formal' prin-
65. Cf. CG 2.92 (Substantiae enim); 2.90 (Praeterea. Si); Despiritualities creaturis
6, in Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2.
66. CG 3.23 (Hoc autem): "Hoc autem manifeste apparet si habitudo con-
sideretur caelestis corporis ad suum ubi. Patitur enim et movetur unumquodque
secundum quod est in potentia, agit vero et movet secundum quod est actu. Corpus
autem caeleste, secundum suam substantiam consideratum, invenitur ut in potentia
indifferenter se habens ad quodlibet ubi, sicut materia prima ad quamlibet formam,
sicut praedictum est. Aliter autem est de corpore gravi et levi, quod, in sua natura
consideratum, non est indifferens ad omnem locum, sed ex ratione suae formae
determinatur sibi locus. Natura igitur corporis gravis et levis est principium activum
motus eius: natura vero corporis caelestis est motus ipsius passivum principium.
Unde non debet alicui videri quod violenter moveatur, sicut corpora gravia et levia,
quae a nobis moventur per intellectum. Corporibus enim gravibus et levibus inest
naturalis aptitudo ad contrarium motum ei quo moventur a nobis, et ideo a nobis
moventur per violentiam: licet motus corporis animalis, quo movetur ab anima, non
sit ei violentus inquantum est animatum, etsi sit ei violentus inquantum est grave
quoddam. Corpora autem caelestia non habent aptitudinem ad motum contra-
rium, sed ad ilium quo moventur a substantia intelligente. Unde simul est volun-
tarius, quantum ad principium activum; et naturalis, quantum ad principium
passivum."
For the comparison to prime matter, see also CG 4.97 (Non debet).
67. CG 3.23 (Hoc autem).
68. "[Passivum principium] est potentia per quam aliquid est naturaliter
susceptivum motionis alterius"; In De caelo 3.2, 1. 7, n. 5 (590); cf. SN 2.14.1.3 ad 1
(quoted above, n. 54). For the term 'receptive', see De pot. 5.5 (below, n. 75); ST
1-2.6.5 ad 2 (below, n. 74); and SN 4.48.2.2 ad 10 (above, n. 54).
69. InDe caelo 1.3,1. 6, n. 13 (70): "contrarietas motuum naturalium consequi-
tur proprietatem principiorum activorum sive formalium, ad quae consequitur
motus; non autem contrarietatem principiorum passivorum sive materialium, quia
eadem materia susceptiva est contrariorum." For a heavenly body's lack of aptitude
to one contrary, see SN 3.22.3.2 sol. 1 (quoted in n. 54).
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ciple of its free fall since it is not indifferent to all locations, but by reason of its
form it is determined to one place,70 down, and is resistant to the contrary,
up.71 The boulder's motion, then, is more 'from its form', as Thomas sees it,
than from its matter.72 By the same token, the principle of the boulder's mo-
tion can be called an 'active' principle since it falls always down not by being
merely in potency but by being partly in act.73
In the second place, the terms 'material' or 'passive' versus 'formal' or
'active' refer to the causality of natural motion, namely, to whether or not
nature needs an additional moving cause in order to be in motion. The
celestial sphere's nature is called 'material' or 'passive' because, by being of
itself simply in potency, it must receive the action of an exterior agent,74 an
intelligence that contains and supplies, as we have seen, that nature's
formal determination. By contrast, the boulder's nature is called a 'formal'
or 'active' principle precisely because falling down is simply a necessary
consequence of it, requiring no new mover for its origin.75 For, explains
Thomas, just as other proper accidents follow necessarily upon substantial
form without another cause, so also does actually being down follow upon
the form heaviness, and hence actually being moved down if the boulder is
70. CG 3.23 (Hoc autem), quoted in n. 66. Through its form (secundum suam
formam), the boulder is owed a certain place when it is not there and is suited to a
certain place when it is; CG 3.23 (Amplius. Si), quoted in n. 58. For the contrast
with the heavens, see Compendium theologiae, in Opera omnia, vol. 42, 1.171: "Ridicu-
lum autem est dicere quod, sicut corpus leue per suam naturam mouetur sursum,
ita corpus caeleste per suam naturam circulariter moueatur sicut per actiuum
principium. . . . Cum . . . motus circularis caelestis corporis non sit ad aliquod ubi
determinatum. . . . Dicitur tamen motus caelestis corporis naturalis, non propter
principium actiuum motus, sed propter ipsum mobile quod habet aptitudinem ut
sic moueatur."
71. See InDe caelo 1.3, 1.6, n. 13 (70), quoted in n. 69.
72. In Met. 5.4,1. 5, n. 819: "motus rerum naturalium magis causatur ex forma
quam ex materia."
73. CG 3.23 (Hoc autem): "unumquodque . . . agit vero et movet secundum
quod est actu . . . . ex ratione suae formae determinatur sibi [corpori gravi et levi]
locus. Natura igitur corporis gravis et levis est principium actiυum motus eius." Cf. ST
1.25.1c: "Manifestum est enim quod unumquodque, secundum quod est actu et
perfectum, secundum hoc est principium activum alicuius; patitur autem
unumquodque, secundum quod est deficiens et imperfectum."
74. ST 1-2.6.5 ad 2: "Dicitur autem aliquid naturale dupliciter. Uno modo, quia
est a natura sicut a principio activo, sicut calefacere est naturale igni. Alio modo,
secundum principium passivum, quia scilicet est innata inclinatio ad recipiendum
actionem a principio extrinseco; sicut motus caeli dicitur esse naturalis, propter
aptitudinem naturalem caelestis corporis ad talem motum, licet movens sit volun-
tarium." See also above, n. 68: susceptivum motionis alterius.
75. De pot. 5.5c: "motus caeli non hoc modo est naturalis caelesti corpori sicut
motus elementaris corporis est sibi naturalis; habet enim huiusmodi motus in
mobili principium, non solum materiale et receptivum, sed etiam formale et acti-
vum. Formam enim ipsius elementaris corporis sequitur talis motus, sicut et aliae
naturales proprietates ex essentialibus principiis consequuntur; unde in eis gene-
rans dicitur esse movens in quantum dat formam quam consequitur motus."
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up and if nothing impedes.7 6 In other words, the principle of motion in the
heavy is 'formal' since natural fall is like a property consequent upon form.77
Aquinas here, furthering a tack taken by Aver roes,78 applies a doctrine
on the causality of necessary accidents79 to his account of natural motion.
According to him, properties are really distinct from and are caused to exist
76. InPhys. 2.1,1. 1, n. 4(144): Έt ideo dicendum est quod in rebus naturalibus
eo modo est principium motus, quo eis motus convenit. Quibus ergo convenit
movere, est in eis principium activum motus; quibus autem competit moveri, est in
eis principium passivum, quod est materia. Quod quidem principium, inquantum
habet potentiam naturalem ad talem formam et motum, facit esse motum natu-
ralem. Et propter hoc factiones rerum artificialium non sunt naturales: quia licet
principium materiale sit in eo quod fit, non tamen habet potentiam naturalem ad
talem formam. Et sic etiam motus localis corporum caelestium est naturalis, licet sit
a motore separato, inquantum in ipso corpore caeli est potentia naturalis ad talem
motum. In corporibus vero gravibus et levibus est principium formale sui motus: quia
sicut alia accidentia consequuntur formam substantialem, ita et locus, et per conse-
quens moveri ad locum: non tamen ita quod forma naturalis sit motor, sed motor
est generans, quod dat talem formam, ad quam talis motus consequitur."
After sui motus, the Leonine and Marietti editions, without basis in the manu-
scripts, record in parentheses the following interpolation, which Weisheipl has
recognized as drawn from In Met. 5.14, 1. 14, n. 955 ("Concept," p. 19, n. 78; see
above, n. 45): "sed huiusmodi principium formale non potest dici potentia activa,
ad quam pertinet motus iste, sed comprehenditur sub potentia passiva: gravitas
enim in terra non est principium ut moveat, sed magis ut moveatur."
77. In addition to the previous two notes, see De motu cordis, 11. 118-21: "motus
sursum est naturalis ignis eo quod consequitur formam eius; unde et generans quod
dat formam est per se mouens secundum locum." See also In Met. 5.12,1. 14, n. 955,
where Aquinas describes a formal principle as that "ad quod consequitur motus, sicut
ad formam gravis vel levis sequitur motus sursum aut deorsum" (quoted in n. 45).
Cf. InDe caelo 1.3,1. 6, n. 13 (70), quoted in n. 69; De ver. 24.1c; CG 2.47 (Amplius.
Principium).
78. Aquinas himself reports, "sicut ipse [Averroes] dicit in commento suo in
hoc loco, motor gravium et levium est generans, qui, dum dat formam, ex conse-
quenti dat motum naturalem, sicut et omnia accidentia naturalia quae consequun-
tur formam: et sic generans causat motum naturalem mediante forma;" In De caelo
3.2, 1. 7, n. 8 (593), referring to Averroes's In De caelo 3.2, t.28, f. 198H-I. For
Averroes's doctrine, see also the following: "hoc, quod moventur in loco, provenit
eis a generante, sicut provenit qualitas propria, /B/ et alia accidentia;" In Phys. 8.4
(255a30-b31), t. 32, f. 370A-B. "Generans enim est illud, quod dat corpori simplici
generate formam suam, et omnia accidentia contingentia formae: quorum unum
est motus in loco" (f. 370G); "causa in hoc, quod moventur ad loca opposita, scilicet
grave, et leve, est quia sunt nata ut sint in locis propriis, scilicet quod esse eorum
non completur, nisi essendo in illis locis, sicut complentur alia accidentia, et propria
sequentia substantiam uniusquisque eorum" (f.37lD; cf. f. 371A-C; InDe caelo 4.3,
t.22, f. 249B-C).
The sole basis in Aristotle for this doctrine is his reference to oίκείoι τόπoi in
Phys. 8.4 (255a3-4). Albert also adopts Averroes's doctrine (Physica 8.2.4, p.
595.15-19; De caelo 3.1.7, p. 218.30-32; 4.2.1, p. 257.17-20). Maier, in "An der
Grenze" pp. 152-53, 155, has recognized the distinctiveness of Averroes's doctrine
and its importance for subsequent gravitational theory.
79. For Aquinas's doctrine, see Barry Brown, Accidental Being: A Study in the
Metaphysics of St. Thomas (Lanham, Md./London, 1985), pp. 70-141.
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by the subject in which they inhere—caused not, however, through the
subject's matter but through its form.80 An animal's powers, for example,
as necessary accidents, 'flow' or 'emanate', maintains Thomas, from an
animal's soul as from a 'principle' or 'agent' that is the 'active cause'
'productive' of them.8 1 At the same time, Aquinas describes the soul's
essence as an 'active principle'8 2 and emphasizes that the powers flow from
this principle without any 'transmutation' but simply as a 'natural result',
much as color results from light.83 In other words, for Aquinas, the soul's
powers proceed from the soul's essence without the occurrence of any
change that requires a mover but simply as a necessary consequence of that
essence as an active principle.
I argue, then, that Aquinas calls nature as a principle of motion in the
heavy and light 'active' in the same sense.84 Just as a property follows upon
substantial form, so downward fall follows necessarily upon the boulder's
'active principle', without the occurrence of any change that requires a
special mover.85 Motion, in other words, is simply a necessary consequence
80. De ente et essentia 6, 11. 59-72, in Opera omnia, vol. 43; CG 1.23 (Amplius.
Omne); Depot. 7 Ac.
81. ST 1.77.6c, ad 2-3; 1.77.7c, ad 1.
82. ST 1.77.6 ad 2: "subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodam-
modo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc
potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut
principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum." See also ST 1.77.7c.
83. ST 1.77.6 ad 3: "emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per
aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno
naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color;" cf. 1.77.7 ad 1. Aquinas is careful to
describe the soul as an 'active principle' but not as an 'active power' or 'mover' of
its own powers, a doctrine that would lead to an infinite regress. In one early text,
however, Aquinas does refer to a subject as in a certain way (quodammodo) an 'active
power' of its properties (Super De tήn. 5.4 ad 4,11. 282-84).
84. CG 3.23 (Amplius. Si): "Licet enim formae simplices [in elementis] non
sint moventes, sunt tamen principia motuum, ad eas enim consequuntur motus
naturales, sicut et omnes aliae naturales proprietates. Non autem potest esse quod
motus caelestis sequatur formam caelestis corporis sicut principium activum." See
also Depot. 5.5c, quoted in n. 75. Selvaggi has previously related Aquinas's explana-
tion of natural motion to the discussion in ST 1.77 of the origin of the soul's powers;
"Concetto," pp. 269-70, and Cosmologia (Rome, 1959), p. 219. But Selvaggi does not
distinguish between 'active power' and 'active principle'; see below, n. 134.
85. Cf. SN 4.22.2.1c, where a link is made between 'that which holds itself
actively to motion' and a 'perfecting principle of motion' not requiring the coop-
eration of any exterior agent, as in gravitational motion: "in quolibet sacramento fit
quaedem promotio vel motus suscipientis ad aliquam sanctitatem. In motibus
autem corporalibus quandoque illud quod movetur non cooperatur ad motum nisi
recipiendo impressionem agentis tantum, sicut contingit in generatione, qua ali-
quid acquirit primam perfectionem sui esse, quae est etiam primum pήncipium
activum in ipso; et similiter etiam quando acquirit aliam perfectionem superaddi-
tam quae limites suae formae excedit; sicut cum paries depingitur, vel cum aer
illuminatur. Quandoque autem perfectio prius suscepta est perficiens pήncipium illius
motus; et tune operatur motum ilium, sicut patet in motu naturali locali, et in
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of heaviness as active when nothing hinders the boulder located outside its
natural place. 'Possessing an active principle', then, is Aquinas's preferred
description of bodies inclined to their motion by an interior source86
alone,87 as opposed to bodies that require a further exterior cause to be
moved.88 At the same time, Aquinas is quite clear that 'active principle',
though it may in itself 'refer to an active power,89 when used of nature does not
sanatione quae fit virtute naturae tantum. Quandoque autem perfectio habita non
sufficit ad operandum effectum, sed cooperatur agenti exteriori, sicut patet cum
ars naturam adjuvat. Et secundum hos tres modos etiam est motus ad sanctitatem.
Unde in baptismo, qui est spiritualis vitae regeneratio, tota sanctificatio ex exteriori
est; nee suscipiens sacramentum se habet active ad illam sanctifϊcationem, sed ut
recipiens tantum; unde signum sacramentale ibi est materia exterius apposita, non
autem aliquis actus ex parte baptizati. Et similiter est in confirmatione, eucharistia,
et extrema unctione, et ordine, quae ordinantur ad aliquam sanctitatem superad-
ditam. Sed in promotione ad sanctitatem per viam merendi sufficit principium
quod intus habetur, sciliet gratia. Et ideo sine aliquo exteriori adjuncto ad hanc
promotionem habens gratiam per actus suos pertingit, quia in eo spiritualis vita est
integra."
86. CG 4.97 (Non debet): "Non debet autem impossibile videri quod motus
caeli cesset. Non enim motus caeli sic est naturalis sicut motus gravium et levium,
ut ab aliquo interiori activo pήncipio inclinetur ad motum: sed dicitur naturalis,
inquantum habet in sua natura aptitudinem ad talem motum; principium autem
illius motus est aliquis intellectus." Elsewhere, however, Aquinas uses 'aptitude? for
'inclinatio' in this sense; GG 3.23 (Hoc autem); ST 1-2.6.5 ad 2; see nn. 66, 74.
87. CG 3.23 (Adhuc. Natura): "Si igitur motus caeli sit a natura tantum, esset or-
dinatus in aliquam quietem. Cuius contrarium apparet: cum sit continuus. Non est
igitur motus caeli a natura sicut a pήncipio activo, sed magis a substantia intelligente."
88. Cf. InDe caelo 3.2,1. 7, n. 9 (594): "Quia id quod naturaliter movetur, habet
sibi inditam virtutem, quae est principium motus: unde non oportet quod ab alio
impellente moveatur, sicut id quod per violentiam movetur, quia nullam virtutem
inditam habet, ad quam sequatur talis motus."
89. As the Index thomisticus indicates, the term, 'active principle' of itself is a genus
that includes 'active power', that is 'a principle of acting on another' (cf. ST 1.25.1c;
In Met. 9.1,1.1, n. 1776). Accordingly, 'active principle' is often used of extrinsic mov-
ers, including the divine power (ST 1.4.1c; 1.14.11c; 1.44.2 ad 2; even of the source of
processions within the Trinity, in ST 1.41.3 ad 2); the causes of substantial change
[CG 3.23 (Non tamen) In Met. 7.9,1.8, n. 1457] and the causes of accidental change,
such as the doctor's or the teacher's science [CG 2.75 (Sciendum tamen)]. Similarly,
'active principle' is also used of intrinsic moving causes, including the soul itself [InDe
cαelo 1.2,1. 3, n. 4 (22) 2.2,1. 2, n. 6 (305) ] the generative power of semen (for exam-
ple, In Met. 7.9,1.8, n. 1442ε) and the active powers of the soul, whether nutritive [CG
2.76 (Item. In); 2.89 (Primo itaque)] and locomotive [CG 3.10 (In actionibus)], or
appetitive [CG 3.56 (Amplius. Nulla); ST 1-2.72.3 ad 1] and intellective (ST
1-2.51.2c), and their principles: logical premises (SN 1.17.1.3c; ST 1-2.54.2 ad 3;
2-2.98.1 ad 2), including natural laws (ST 1-2.93.5 ad 1), or ends of action (ST
1-2.54.2 ad 3). For Thomas, however, nature as an intrinsic per se principle of motion
cannot be a moving cause (see above, nn. 45-46). Hence, Aquinas never describes na-
ture as an 'active power' but only as an 'active principle' since this term alone is ge-
neric enough not to refer only to movers.
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refer to a mover.90 Nature is called 'active principle', explains the De caelo
commentary, contrary to Averroes, not as a mover or as an agent is active
but as an instrument is active,91 determining the action of its agent, just as
color is the 'active' instrument of light in vision.92 The boulder's form of
heaviness, therefore, is not a mover but is a 'principle with which' (quo) the
boulder is moved, that is, an active principle.93
D.
Given the distinction between nature as an active-formal versus a passive-
material principle, I turn to the fourth element, which has three stages:
'active nature' as an accidental characteristic is both (1) in act and (2)
in potency, and therefore (3) Aquinas's conception of it differs from
90. CG 3.23 (Amplius. Si), quoted in n. 84. Although only here and in the text
of the following note does Aquinas deny that nature as an active principle is a mover,
the same point may be inferred from many passages. See below, n. 133.
91. In De caelo 3.2, 1. 7, n. 9 (594): Έxistimavit enim [Averroes] quod forma
corporis gravis et levis sit pήncipium activum motus per modum moventis, ut sic
oporteat esse aliquam resistentiam ad inclinationem formae; et quod motus non
procedat immediate a generante qui dat formam. Sed hoc est omnino falsum. Nam
forma gravis et levis non est principium motus sicut agens motum, sed sicut quo
movens movet; sicut color est principium visionis, quo aliquid videtur. Unde et
Aristoteles dicit in 8 Physicorum, post ea quae dixerat de motu gravium et levΐum:
quod quidem igitur nihil horum movet seipsum manifestum est: sed motus habent
principium, non movendi neque faciendi, sed patiendi. Sic igitur motus gravium et
levium non procedit a generante mediante alio principio movente; neque etiam
oportet aliam resistentiam quaerere in hoc motu, quam illam quae est inter gene-
rans et genitum. Et sic relinquitur quod aer non requiratur ad motum naturalem
ex necessitate, sicut in motu violento. Quia id quod naturaliter movetur, habet sibi
inditam virtutem, quae est principium motus: unde non oportet quod ab alio impel-
lente moveatur, sicut id quod per violentiam movetur, quia nullam virtutem inditam
habet, ad quam sequatur talis motus."
92. On this analogy, cf. SN 3.14.1.2c: "Sicut autem in sensu visus est duplex
activum: unum quasi primum agens et movens, sicut lux; aliud quasi movens
motum, sicut color factus visibilis actu per lucem; ita in intellectu est quasi primum
agens lumen intellectus agentis; et quasi movens motum, species per ipsum facta
intelligibilis actu." Cf. also ST 1.77.3c, 1.105.3c, l-2.9.1c, l-2.10.2c.
93. In addition to InDe caelo 3.2,1. 7, n. 9 (594), see De vex. 22.3c, 11. 58-79: "Res
enim spirituales absolute habent naturam ut moveant sed non ut moveantur;
corpora autem moventur quidem, et quamvis unum possit alterum movere non
tamen aliquod eorum potest movere se ipsum, quia ilia quae movent se ipsa, ut
probatur in 8 Physicorum, dividuntur in duas partes quarum una est movens et alia
mota. Quod quidem in rebus pure corporalibus esse non potest, quia formae
eorum non possunt esse moventes, quamvis possint esse motus pήncipium ut quo
aliquid movetur, sicut in motu terrae gravitas est principium quo movetur non tamen
est motor. Et hoc contingit turn propter simplicitatem corporum inanimatorum
quae non habent tantam diversitatem in partibus ut una pars possit esse movens et
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WeisheipΓs. It is clear by now that nature as formal and active is not
merely an indeterminate potency, as is nature as material and passive. Na-
ture's formal and active character comes precisely from the fact that it
is partially in act.94 Accordingly, Aquinas speaks of such nature as a virtus95
or a vis,96 that is, as an actual characteristic of certain bodies distinct
from their substantial form.97 In the case of elemental bodies, Aquinas
calls that characteristic gravitas or levitas, an inclination 'superadded to
their essence',98 which, he insists, is no less accidental to the elements
than is heat or cold.99 In fact, heaviness and lightness are one of Aristotle's
own major examples of the category of quality.100 Aquinas identifies these
as exemplifying the category's third species, 'passive quality', that is, that
with respect to which mobile substances are altered.101 Accordingly, he
alia mota, turn etiam propter ignobilitatem et materialitatem formarum quae, quia
longe distant a formis separatis quarum est movere, non retinent ut movere possint
sed solum ut sint motus principia."
94. See above, n. 73.
95. InDe caelo 3.2,1. 7, n. 9 (594), quoted in n. 91; Depot. 3.7c, quoted in n. 141.
Cf. Aquinas's definition of virtus in the sense of an intrinsic potency consequent
upon form: "hoc enim dicimus potentiam principium intrinsecum quo agens agit
vel patiens patitur. Haec quidem potentia, secundum quod refertur ad ultimum in
quod aliquid potest, accipit nomen et rationem virtutis. Huiusmodi autem virtus
que est talium actionum vel passionum principium, manifeste ostenditur ex forma
rei specifica derivari; omne enim accidens quod est proprium alicuius speciei
derivatur ex principiis essentialibus illius speciei" {De operationibus occultis naturae, 11.
106-11, in Opera omnia, vol. 43).
96. CG 3.23 (Amplius. Si), quoted in n. 58. Cf. Aquinas's definition of vis:
"virtus, secundum sui nominis rationem, potentiae complementum designat; unde
et vis dicitur, secundum quod res aliqua per potestatem completam quam habet,
potest sequi suum impetum vel motum . . . . unde Philosophus dicit in 1 Caeli et
Mundi, quod virtus est ultimum in re de potentia" {De virtutibus in communi 1.1c, in
Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2).
97. In addition to the arguments for this distinction already referred to (see
above, nn. 47-48), we may add one here drawn from Thomas's theology of the Lord's
supper. The heaviness of bread and wine is among the other accidents that continue
to be present there even without its substantial form. See ST 1.75.5,1.77.1-3.
98. ST 1.59.2c: "Unde videmus in corporibus naturalibus quod inclinatio quae
est ad esse rei, non est per aliquid superadditum essentiae, sed per materiam, quae
appetit esse antequam habeat, et per formam, quae tenet rem in esse postquam
fuerit. Sed inclinatio ad aliquid extrinsecum est per aliquid essentiae superadditum;
sicut inclinatio ad locum est per gravitatem vel levitatem."
99. SN 2.14.1.5 ad 2: "sicut calor et frigus non sunt formae substantiales
elementorum, ita nee gravitas et levitas; quia non possent esse aliis corporibus
accidentales. Unde sicut substantia non est principium alterationis nisi mediante
calore vel frigore, ita nee est principium motus vel quietis localis nisi mediante
gravitate et levitate."
100. Met. Δ.14 (1020b8-12, bl7-18).
101. In Met. 5.14, 1. 16, n. 993; cf. Aristotle, Categoήae, ed. L. Minio-Paluello
(Oxford, 1949), 8 (9a36-10al0). Heaviness and lightness are not 'passive' in the
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elsewhere includes gravity and levity in his list of the active and passive
qualities of the elements.102
'Nature as active', then, is a kind of quality that actualizes certain
substances, as in the case of heaviness or lightness. At the same time, of
course, such nature, as a principle of motion, is still a potency for further
motion and for a determinate end of that motion,103 as the terms virtus and
vis continue to indicate. Heaviness and lightness are of themselves poten-
cies awaiting further actualization, namely, to be up or down.104 Hence, we
may conclude, active-formal nature refers to a quality that actualizes a
substance to be in potency for some further determinate act. For Aquinas,
this is partly why Aristotle's discussion of natural fall appeals to the distinc-
tion between first and second actuality, between, for example, the grammar-
ian's habitual knowledge and the exercise of that knowledge.105 The
student, explains Aquinas, even once having been led through the action
of a teacher from first potency to first act, comes thereby to possess yet
another potency, a potency for actually using the new grammatical knowl-
edge; that is, the student comes to possess an 'act that is still in potency'.106
sense of being productive of sensations but of being the result of a qualitative
change. Hence, heaviness and lightness as 'passive' are not being considered as
principles of local motion but as terms of alteration, as when water evaporated by
the sun becomes air that is light. Cf. Aristotle, Phys. 8.4 (255b5-13).
102. CG 2.68 (Invenimus enim); SN 2.14.1.5c. Thus, also, iron has a quality of
being moved to a magnet; see above, n. 61.
103. See above, nn. 42 and 45. According to ST 1-2.10.1 ad 2, natural rise and
fall, as actualizations of what is in potency, are not merely consequents of form but
also of matter: "in rebus naturalibus id quod est naturale quasi consequens formam
tantum, semper actu inest, sicut calidum igni. Quod autem est naturale sicut
consequens materiam, non semper actu inest sed quandoque secundum potentiam
tantum. Nam forma est actus, materia vero potentia. 'Motus autem est actus exis-
tentis in potentia.' Et ideo ilia quae pertinent ad motum, vel quae sequuntur
motum in rebus naturalibus, non semper insunt, sicut ignis non semper movetur
sursum, sed quando est extra locum suum." Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de malo 5.5c,
in Opera omnia, vol. 23.
104. InPhys. 8.4,1. 8, n. 5 (1033): Ήaec ergo, scilicet aqua, primo est in potentia
levis, et postmodum [qua aer] fit levis in actu; et tune statim habet operationem suam,
nisi aliquid prohibeat. Sed iam levis existens comparatur ad locum sicut potentia ad
actum (actus enim levis, inquantum huiusmodi, est esse in aliquo loco determinato,
scilicet sursum): sed prohibetur ne sit sursum, per hoc quod est in contrario loco,
scilicet deorsum, quia non potest esse simul in duobus locis." See also n. 7 (1035),
quoted below, n. 131. Cf. In Met. 5.4,1.5, n. 826 (below, n. 110).
105. Aristotle, Phys. 8.4(255a33-bl3). Cf. De anima 2.5 (417a21-30).
106. In Phys. 8.4, 1. 8, n. 3 (1031): "Ex prima autem potentia in secundam
reducitur aliquid, cum activum suo passivo coniungitur; et tune passivum per
praesentiam activi fit in tali actu, qui adhuc est in potentia; sicut addiscens per
actionem docentis reducitur de potentia in actum, cui actui coniungitur altera potentia.
Et sic existens in prima potentia, fit in alia potentia: quia iam habens scientiam, sed
non considerans, quodammodo est in potentia ad actum scientiae, sed non eodem
modo, sicut antequam addisceret. Ergo de prima potentia reducitur in actum cui
coniungitur secunda potentia, per aliquod agens."
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Similarly, the boulder has a first actuality, an accidental quality or 'nature',
not possessed by the heavens, namely, heaviness, which actualizes the 'first
potency' of matter. Nevertheless, heaviness is still only a potency to a second
act until the boulder falls.107 Heaviness, in Aquinas's terms, is a first act 'to
which is adjoined a second potency', namely, to actually being down.
Given that nature as an active-formal principle is a quality in potency
to further act, it is important to reemphasize that nature in this sense is,
therefore, obviously distinct from nature as a substance's matter or form. In
fact, the principle of natural motion is often referred to by Aquinas simply
as 'form'.1 0 8 Such instances should usually be understood to mean the
accidental form through which the natural body is moved, like gravitas or
leυitas.109 Occasionally, though, the form referred to can only mean substan-
tial form.1 1 0 Nevertheless, even such references are perfectly consonant
with Aquinas's doctrine on nature as an accidental quality since substantial
form is the ultimate source of all the acts or motions stemming from a
substance per se, just as prime matter is the ultimate source of all of a
substance's natural passivities. For Thomas, no accident acts except through
its substantial form.1 1 1 At the same time, it is equally true for him that no
created substantial form acts except through accidents.112 Neither the sub-
107. See above, n. 104. According to ST 1.84.3, air only potentially rising is still
'light' only in potency and is not yet light in actuality (that is, is still in potency to
second actuality).
108. In addition to the texts in the following two notes, see SN 2.14.1.3c, ad 1,
and 3.22.3.2 sol. 1 (quoted in nn. 54, 56); CG 3.23 (Amplius. Si) (quoted in n. 58);
Depot. 5.5c (above, n. 75); De motu cordis, 11. 118-21 (above, n. 77); ST 1.105.2c, 5c
(below, n. 145).
109. See especially indita virtus in InDe caelo 3.2, 1. 7, n. 9 (594) (quoted above,
n. 91); De ver. 22.3c (above, n. 93); In Met. 5.12,1. 14, n. 955 (above, n. 45). Cf. SN
2.14.1.5 ad 2 (above, n. 99).
110. CG 4.35 (Amplius. Nomen naturae), quoted in n. 40; In Phys. 2.1, 1. 1, n.
4 (144), quoted in n. 76; CG 2.47 (Amplius. Principium); In Met. 5.4 (1015al3-19),
1. 5, n. 826: '"primo et proprie natura dicitur substantia', idest forma rerum haben-
tium in se principium motus inquantum huiusmodi. Materia enim dicitur esse
natura, quia est formae susceptibilis. Et generationes habent nomen naturae, quia
sunt motus procedentes a forma, et iterum ad formas. Et 'idipsum', scilicet forma
est principium motus rerum existentium secundum naturam, aut in actu, aut in
potentia. Forma enim non semper facit motum in actu, sed quandoque in potentia
tantum: sicut quandoque impeditur motus naturalis ab aliquo exteriori prohibente,
vel etiam quando impeditur actio naturalis ex materiae defectu."
111. ST 1.77.1 ad 4: "hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis princi-
pium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis est primum actionis
principium, sed non proximum. Et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit quod id 'quo
intelligimus et sentimus, est anima'"; cf. 1.77.5 ad 1. In Met. 7.9, 1. 8, n. 1457:
"Qualitates etiam activae, licet sint activae, non tamen agunt solum in virtute
propria, sed in virtute formarum substantialium ad quae se habent sicut instru-
menta; sicut dicitur in secundo De anima, quod calor ignis est sicut instrumentum
animae nutritivae." SN 1.3.4.2 ad 2: "essentia ipsius animae est etiam principium
operandi, sed mediante virtute."
112. "In omnibus autem aliis [Deo] operatio est accidens: et ideo oportet quod
proximum principium operationis sit accidens, sicut videmus in corporibus quod
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stantial form nor the prime matter is the proximate principle of natural
motions, but such motions always occur through the mediation of an
accidental principle, nature as active or passive.113
WeisheipΓs difficulties, I argue, stem ultimately from equating, as prin-
ciples of motion, nature as substantial form and 'nature as formal and
active'.114 Precisely because Weisheipl tends to identify active-formal nature
with substantial form, he thinks of such nature as wholly in act. As such, it
can be conceived as spontaneously acting and moving without need of a
mover.
115
 WeisheipΓs principal evidence for this interpretation lies in Aqui-
nas's discussion of natural rise and fall as a second actuality.116 As soon as
air comes to exist, maintains Thomas, it 'immediately operates' through its
own nature, just as does the educated student, who now can think of
grammar independently of any teacher teaching.117 Thus, for Weisheipl,
when air rises, its active nature spontaneously 'acts' or 'moves of itself
independently of any cause.
forma substantialis ignis nullam operationem habet, nisi mediantibus qualitatibus
activis et passivis, quae sunt quasi virtutes et potentiae ipsius" (SN 1.3.4.2c). Other-
wise, a creature's act would be its essence, so that the creature would always be
acting, and it would have only one action (cf. ST 1.77.1c; 1.54.1, 3c); air, for
example, would always be up (cf. ST 1.59.2c).
113. SN 2.14.1.5 ad 2, quoted in n. 99.
114. "Concept," p. 12: "nature as an active and spontaneous principle . . . [for
Aristotle] properly applies to 'form'; if the term is applied to 'matter,' it connotes pas-
sivity ... in scholastic terminology nature as 'matter' is equivalent to pήncipiumpassi-
vum, receptivum, and materiale; while nature as 'form' is equivalent to pήncipium
activum, oτ formale" "Interpretation," p. 525: "the word 'nature' can be used in two
senses: in the active sense of 'form' as a formal principle (ut principium formale seu
activum) or in the passive sense of'matter' as a material principle (ut principium ma-
teriale seu passivum). Therefore the natural philosopher must study both the active
principle (form) and the passive principle (matter) of all natural things." "Aristotle's
Concept," pp. 144-45: "all these phenomena we call 'natural' in the universe can be
traced back to some ultimate and primary principle we call the 'form' of the thing,
the 'nature' of the thing. This 'form' is an active, dynamic source oϊ what is actually ob-
served in human experience . . . . Thus for Aristotle the word 'nature' can be used in
two senses. In the sense of'form', it is active, dynamic, and spontaneous;" cf. p. 141. In
speaking of the substantial form as a principle of motion ("Aristotle's Concept," p.
153), Weisheipl fails to use the distinction, which he does occasionally acknowledge
(see p. 145; "Concept," p. 12), between substantial form and its mediating accidents.
For this failure, see especially the texts cited above, n. 10.
115. "Nature as form simply acts spontaneously whether there is a resisting
medium or not" ("Aristotle's Concept," p. 148).
116. In addition to the texts cited above, n. 10, see "Specter," pp. 112-13;
"Principle Omne quod movetur" p. 90; "Aristotle's Concept," p. 148.
117. "Statim habet operationem suam;" In Phys. 8.4,1. 8, n. 5 (1033), quoted
above, n. 104. Aquinas thus applies to air his account of the student who possesses
the first actuality of knowledge [n. 3 (1031)]: "Sed quando sic se habet quod habet
habitum scientiae, non oportet quod reducatur in secundum actum per aliquod
agens, sed statim per seipsum operatur considerando, nisi sit aliquid prohibens, puta
occupatio vel infirmitas aut voluntas." See also Aquinas's ambiguous formulation in
CG2.74 (Item. Postea).
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Now, Weisheipl has well brought out the fact that, for Aquinas, nature
as an active principle, as we have seen, requires no further mover in order
that natural motion occur. This is precisely what, for Thomas, Aristotle's
distinction between first and second actuality is principally intended to
indicate: what possesses a second potency does not require the action of an
agent other than the source of its first actuality in order to be 'reduced' to
second act. Furthermore, Weisheipl is correct that, for Thomas, nature as
active produces its own act and can even be said, in a sense, 'to act' in the
active voice, as we shall see.1 1 8
But Weisheipl does not do justice, I argue, to the passive character of
'nature as an active principle of motion', 1 1 9 to the fact, that is, that the
boulder's heaviness must first be seen as a passive principle and can then be
understood as an active-formal kind of passive principle.1 2 0 In fact, the boul-
der's nature, precisely insofar as it is a 'second potency', is a passive potency
and, like all 'second potencies', requires an agent in order to be actualized.
In the same way, for Aquinas, habits in the intellect or will are reduced into
second act only through the causation of an agent1 2 1—even though as first
actualities they require no new per se agent in order to be exercised. Conse-
quently, even where Aquinas stresses, in Deveritate22.lc, that what has nature
as an active principle 'acts' in the active voice, he also affirms that it under-
goes motion or 'is moved' in the passive voice. Aquinas, having spoken of the
boulder's natural inclination provided to it by its generator, writes,
And, in this way, all natural things are inclined to what is fitting for
them, possessing within themselves some principle of their inclination.
In virtue of this principle, their inclination is natural, so that, in a
certain way, they themselves 'go to' and are not merely 'led to' their
due ends. For, things resulting from violence are only 'led', since they
contribute nothing to what moves them; but natural things also 'go to'
[their] ends insofar as they cooperate with what inclines and directs
them through the principle placed within them.122
118. In addition to the text quoted in the following paragraph, see operatur in
SN 4.22.2.1c (quoted in n. 85). For the statement that operatio belongs to passive as
well as to active powers, see De ver. 16.1 ad 13.
119. See above, nn. 42 and 43.
120. In Met. 5.12, 1. 14, n. 955, quoted in n. 45.
121. For the mover of intellect and will, see ST 1-2.9.1, 3-6. Cf. De unionebc.
"si virtus quae est actionis principium, ab alia superiori virtute moveatur, operatio
ab ipsa procedens non solum est actio, sed etiam passio; in quantum scilicet
procedit a virtute quae a superiori movetur."
122. De ver. 22.1, 11. 169-78: Έt per hunc modum omnes res naturales in ea
quae eis conveniunt sunt inclinata, habentia in se ipsis aliquod suae inclinationis
principium, ratione cuius eorum inclinatio naturalis est, ita ut quodam modo ipsa
vadant et non solum ducantur in fines debitos; violenta enim tantum modo ducun-
tur quia nihil conferunt moventi, sed naturalia etiam vadunt in fines, in quantum
cooperantur inclinanti et dirigenti per principium eis inditum." I know of no
parallels in Aquΐnas's later works to this bold description of nature as acting. But
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According to this fourth doctrinal element, then, 'nature as active' is a
quality of certain natural substances by which they are in potency for some
further determinate act. We can now understand the status of such nature
in relation to efficient causality. On the one hand, as Weisheipl has rightly
emphasized, such a principle is not the mover of bodies like the heavy and
the light. Aquinas repeatedly insists on this point, contrary to Averroes.123
Otherwise, argues Thomas, the heavy and the light will not be moved by
another, in violation of the principle OQM.124 Such elements cannot be
self-moved as are animals.125 First, they do not have distinct parts moving
and moved because of the simplicity of their bodies and the materiality of
their forms.126 Second, they are not alive, nor do they have in their control
equally to move and to rest or to vary their direction.127 Thomas concludes,
following Aristotle's own formula in Physics 8.4, that nature even in this
active sense is not a 'principle of moving or of acting but of undergoing'128
or of being moved.129
On the other hand, according to this same formula, 'active nature' in
Aquinas is never properly 'agentless'. Only in Weisheipl does nature in the
active sense refer to what simply moves and acts spontaneously. The boul-
der's heaviness, affirms Thomas, is a passive principle130 that is a potency
compare ST 1.83.1c, where, again, both the active and passive voice are used:
"quaedam agunt absque iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum."
123. SN 2.14.1.3c, quoted in n. 56; Dever. 22.3c, above, n. 93; CG 3.23 (Amplius.
Si), quoted in n. 58; In Phys. 2.1, 1. 1, n. 4 (144), quoted above, n. 76; In Met. 5.12,
1. 14, n. 955, above, n. 45; InDe caelo 3.2, 1. 7, n. 9 (594), quoted in n. 91.
124. In Met. 5.12, 1. 14, n. 955, quoted in n. 45.
125. In Met. 5.12,1. 14, n. 955. See also InDe caelo 1.2, 1. 3, n. 4 (22), quoted in
n. 130; ST 1.18.1 ad 2; 3.32.4c, below, n. 133.
126. De ver. 22.3c, quoted in n. 93. See also 24.1c; In Phys. 8.4, L 7, n. 8 (1028).
Cf. CG 2.47 (Amplius. Principium), 2.68 (Invenimus enim); ST 1.115.3 ad 2.
According to CG 3.23 (Item. Corpora), the form of the heavy and light cannot be
a mover of matter since only bodies are moved.
127. In Phys. 8.4, 1. 7, nn. 6-7 (1026-27).
128. In Phys. 8.4 (255b29-31), 1. 8, n. 7 (1035), quoted in n. 131; InDe caelo
1.2, 1. 3, n. 4 (22), quoted in n. 130; 3.2, 1. 7, n. 9 (594), quoted in n. 91.
129. "Principium ut moveatur" (In Met. 5.12, 1. 14, n. 955; see also the text in
the following note).
130. In addition to the texts in the following note and in n. 133, see In De caelo
1.2, 1. 3, n. 4 (22): "duplex est principium motus: unum quidem activum, quod est
ipse motor, et tale principium motus animalium est anima: aliud autem est princi-
pium motus passivum, scilicet secundum quod corpus habet aptitudinem ut sic
moveatur, et huiusmodi principium motus est in gravibus et levibus. Non enim
componuntur ex movente et moto, ut Philosophus dicit in 8 Physicorum: quod
quidem, inquit, nihil horum, scilicet gravium et levium, ipsum movet seipsum,
manifestum est: sed motus habent principium, non movendi neque faciendi, sed
patiendi. Sic igitur dicendum est quod principium activum motus caelestium cor-
porum est intellectualis substantia: principium autem passivum est natura illius
corporis, secundum quam natum est tali motu moveri. Et esset simile in nobis si
anima non moveret corpus nostrum nisi secundum naturalem inclinationem eius,
scilicet deorsum." Cf. also In Phys. 2.1, 1. 1, n. 4 (144), quoted above, n. 76.
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for further act.131 Nature as an 'active principle', in other words, is funda-
mentally a passive potency rather than an active power.132 In fact, Thomas
occasionally will even deny that heaviness and lightness are 'active princi-
ples' at all, namely, in the sense of active powers.133 For him, a boulder's
heaviness is 'active' or 'acts', again, not as does an agent but as does an
instrument, mediating the action of a prior agent.134 But on what agent
does the boulder depend for its free fall?
131. In Phys. 8.4, 1. 8, n. 7 (1035): "Concludit [Aristoteles] igitur manifestum
esse ex dictis, quod nihil horum, scilicet gravium et levium, movet seipsum: sed
tamen motus eorum est naturalis, quia habent principium motus in seipsis; non
quidem principium motivum aut activum, sed principium passivum, quod est po-
tentia ad talem actum. Ex quo patet contra intentionem philosophi esse, quod in
materia sit principium activum, quod quidam dicunt esse necessarium ad hoc quod
sit motus naturalis: sufficit enim ad hoc passivum principium, quod est potentia
naturalis ad actum."
132. In Met. 5.12, 1. 14, n. 955; quoted in n. 45.
133. In addition to In Phys. 8.4, 1. 8, n. 7 (1035), in n. 131 above, see the
following three texts. In De caelo 2.2, 1. 2, n. 6 (305): "in corporibus animatis est
principium activum motus, quod est anima: in corporibus autem inanimatis non est
principium motus activum, quod scilicet moveat, sed moventur ab exteriori
movente, quod est generans vel removens prohibens. Interius autem habent prin-
cipium motus passivum, quo scilicet nata sunt moveri, puta gravitatem vel levitatem,
ut patet in 8 Physicorum." InDe caelo 2.2,1. 3, n. 2 (314): "[corpora inanimata] non
habent in se principium activum motus, sed soltim passivum, ut dicitur in 8 Physi-
corum." ST 3.32.4c: "transmutatio dicitur naturalis propter principium intrinsecum
non solum activum, sed etiam passivum; expresse enim dicit Philosophus in 8
Physicorum, quod in gravibus et levibus est principium passivum motus naturalis, et
non activum. Nee est possibile quod materia agat ad sui formationem, quia non est
actu. Nee est etiam possibile quod aliquid moveat seipsum, nisi dividatur in duas
partes, quarum una sit movens et alia sit mota, quod in solis animatis contingit, ut
probatur, 8 Physicorum."
134. In De caelo 3.2, 1. 7, n. 9 (594), quoted in n. 91. Selvaggi, in "Concetto,"
pp. 260-66, finds an apparent contradiction in Aquinas's repeated insistence that
nature is only a passive principle and is sometimes also an active principle. He
resolves the problem by positing an evolution in Aquinas's doctrine, although not
a radical one, as well as a degree of uncertainty, imprecision, and incompleteness
in Aquinas's scattered discussions (pp. 266, 276; cf. p. 270). For Selvaggi (p. 268),
Aquinas's authentic teaching is consistently that nature is the heavy and light is an
active power. By the 'passivity' of such bodies Aquinas refers only to (a) the fact that
heaviness 'acts' as a formal rather than as an efficient cause and lacks the self-deter-
mination and autonomy found in animate efficient causes; or (b) to the fact that
heaviness, even as a true efficient cause, is only an instrumental cause of the body's
past generator (pp. 269-74; cf. Cosmologia, p. 219). Selvaggi's problem disappears,
I maintain, once the term 'active principle' is properly understood since, as we have
seen, the term is neither equated with 'active power' nor opposed to 'passive
potency'. In fact, contra Selvaggi ("Concetto," pp. 267-68), the affirmation of In
Phys. 2.1, 1. 1, n. 4 (144), that active-formal nature is a passive potency, far from
being a mere self-contradictory interpolation, is actually Aquinas's authentic teach-
ing. See above, n. 76.
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E.
At this point one may rightly wonder, even admitting that nature as an active
principle is a passive potency, why Aquinas therefore needs to regard nature
as requiring an agent at all. Why cannot some secondary potencies, for
Thomas, simply actualize of themselves, as Weisheipl holds, so that, for
example, natural rise and fall occur spontaneously, without any moving
cause? The answer constitutes the fifth element of Aquinas's doctrine.
For Aquinas, to say that a potency actualizes of itself is equivalent to
saying that a potency acts.135 But two reasons can be found in Thomas why
passive potency of itself cannot act. First, that which is in potency as in
potency does not yet exist, but what does not exist cannot act.136 Second,
nothing acts except insofar as it is in act.137 Hence, if potency acts, it must
be in act. But nothing is simultaneously both in potency and in act.138 It
follows, therefore, that every passive potency as such requires something
distinct from it in act in order that it be reduced into act.
These two reasons indicate, then, why nature as a principle of motion,
insofar as it is fundamentally a passive potency, requires a distinct agent in
order to be actualized. Even nature as an active principle in the heavy and
light cannot act of itself spontaneously without a distinct moving cause. On
the same grounds, it is clear why, for Thomas, unlike for Weisheipl, the
135. CG 1.16 (Item. Videmus). Cf. Aristotle's expression in Phys. 8.4 (255blO);
Met. K.9 (1065b21-23).
136. "Item. Videmus aliquid esse in mundo quod exit de potentia in actum.
Non autem educit se de potentia in actum: quia quod est potentia, nondum est;
unde nee agere potest. Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, quo educatur de
potentia in actum;" CG 1.16 (quo Leonine: qui Marietti). See my account of this
argument in "Why Motion," pp. 250-51.
137. In Phys. 2.1,1. 1, n. 3 (143): "Dicunt ergo quidam quod etiam in huiusmodi
mutationibus principium activum motus est in eo quod movetur; non quidem
perfectum, sed imperfectum, quod coadiuvat actionem exterioris agentis. Dicunt
enim quod in materia est quaedam inchoatio formae, quam dicunt esse priva-
tionem, quae est tertium principium naturae; et ab hoc principio intrinseco genera-
tiones et alterationes corporum simplicium naturales dicuntur. Sed hoc non potest
esse: quia, cum nihil agat nisi secundum quod est in actu, praedicta inchoatio
formae, cum non sit actus, sed aptitudo quaedam ad actum, non potest esse
principium activum. Et praeterea, etiam si esset forma completa, non ageret in
suum subiectum alterando ipsum: quia forma non agit, sed compositum; quod non
potest seipsum alterare, nisi sint in eo duae partes, quarum una sit alterans et alia
alterata." Note that 'active principle' here once again refers to an 'active power'; see
above, n. 133. Aquinas has also once used the principle 'nothing acts except as in
act' in presenting Aristotle's argument that everything moved is moved by another
[CG 1.13 (Tertio, probat)].
138. If a potency were also in act, continues the Physics commentary, it would
be divided into two parts, of which one moved the other. But, again, this is proper
only to animate beings; see above, n. 125. Cf. the same reasoning in ST 3.32.4
(quoted in n. 133): matter cannot act for its own 'formation' since it is not in act,
and only animate beings move themselves; hence, nature is a passive principle.
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principle OQM applies to absolutely every motion—why even the boulder's
natural fall requires a distinct efficient cause. For every motion, including
that of the heavy and light, involves the reduction of some potency into act.
Furthermore, what is true at the outset of motion is equally true throughout
the duration of any motion, whether natural or not, namely, that motion,
as a reduction from potency into act, will require the constant exercise of a
distinct agent. Consequently, Aquinas can say, "the coming to be of a thing
cannot remain upon the cessation of the action of the agent that is the
cause of the effect with respect to its coming to be."139
E
A final question remains: if the boulder's natural fall requires the constant
exertion of an efficient cause, can such an extrinsic cause be found in
Aquinas's physics? Is Aquinas forced to affirm, after all, a conjoined mover
that pushes the boulder down, the very cause that Weisheipl began by
rejecting?140 The sixth doctrinal element provides an answer that is nega-
tive. For Aquinas, as we have seen, there is no further efficient cause of the
139. "Fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa
effectus secundum fieri" (ST 1.104.1c). Cf. CG 3.65 (Adhuc. Licet); In Phys. 2.3, 1.
6, n. 9 (195); also SN 1.37.1.1 ad 3: "esse rei non potest conservari sine causa
essendi, sicut nee motus sine causa movente."
140. Aquinas himself never criticizes a theory of a motor coniunctus of natural
bodies and never uses the term in discussing the heavy and light. His seven uses of
the term all refer to a soul in its relation to its own body moved by it. Thus,
according to the 'philosophers', the heavens are moved both by separate, final
movers and by 'conjoined' movers, the souls of the spheres (SN 2.10.1.2c). This
'conjoined mover' is associated first with Avicenna (SN 2.14.1.3c), then with Aver-
roes [De spir. creat. 6 ad 10; In Phys. 8.10,1. 21, n. 9 (1149)]. Aquinas himself insists
that motion by a 'conjoined mover' is proper to life and therefore does not belong
to the bodies that angels assume in communicating with humans since angels are
not the forms of such bodies (ST 1.51.3 ad 3). He usually prefers not to attribute
to the heavens a conjoined mover in this sense, as a form of the celestial body {De
ver. 5.9 ad 14; De pot. 6.6 ad 9; but cf. Quaestiones de anima 8 ad 3, in Quaestiones
disputatae, vol. 2).
The term motor coniunctus, thus, is more precise than the term coniungitur since
Aquinas will say that, in a broad sense, every agent touches {contingit) or is in contact
(coniungitur) with what it moves, whether through corporeal-quantitative contact or
through 'virtual' contact (ST 1.8.1c; 1.8.2 ad 1); cf. In Phys. 8.5, 1. 11, n. 3 (1064).
In the broad sense, even angels are said 'to be conjoined to' the bodies that they
assume, conjoined not as their form but as their mover (SN 3.6.3.2c; cf. 2.31.2.1 ad
1), through the 'contact of their power' (ST 1.8.2 ad 2; 1.52.1c). In this sense, the
human soul cannot be 'conjoined' to its body merely as mover to mobile [CG 2.57
(Amplius. Mobile) ].
Ironically, Albert may have inspired WeisheipΓs injunction against a motor
coniunctus. In De caelo 3.1.7, p. 218.7-25, Albert mentions quidam who think that
natural motion is from a 'conjoined mover' that is never separated from its mobile.
Consequently, they think air is unnecessary as a medium in the motion of the heavy
and light. Yet, Albert's point is not that a heavy body's form is not its mover but that,
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boulder's fall than that which originally 'generated' the boulder, giving to
it its nature in the first place. Unlike 'passive nature', nature as active
requires no further mover in order to be actualized. As long as there is no
obstacle, natural motion simply follows necessarily upon a 'dislocated' boul-
der's 'active nature' as a proximate principle and upon its substantial form
as a remote principle. At the same time, how can the causes that originally
produced the boulder be regarded as actuating each of its subsequent
downward falls even as they occur? In what proper sense can your parents,
for Aquinas, be even now causing the continuous natural beating of your
heart? In short, what cause concurrently reduces nature as an active princi-
ple from potency into act?
Without going into the details of Aquinas's cosmology here, an answer
to this question may be sketched in light of the discussion of causality in
Summa theologiae 1.104-5. First, it is clear that, for Thomas, the 'mover' in
the case of 'active nature' is of a special kind: rather than acting anew in
each natural motion, it moves, as we have seen, simply by giving the form
that is the principle of that motion.141 At the same time, the 'generator', in
the sense of the univocal cause of substantial change, like a parent,142 can
be the per se cause, I argue, only of those natural motions that occur
immediately upon generation.143 Such a terrestrial generator, according to
Thomas, is the cause not of a given form qua that form but only of the
apparently, the form is a mover only by moving the air, which in turn carries the
body (pp. 218.12-15, 218.87-219.18). This is Averroes's explanation; see above, nn.
55, 59. Cf. Physica 4.2.7, p. 248.33-92. Elsewhere, Albert accepts the view that the
elements have a 'mover conjoined to' them, causing their natural motion (7.1.3, p.
523.52-59; cf. 522.21-25).
141. ST 1.105.3c: "in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam
quae est principium motus." Cf. Depot. 3.7c: "actionis alicuius rei res alia potest dici
causa multipliciter. Uno modo quia tribuit ei virtutem operandi; sicut dicitur in 4
Physicorum, quod generans movet grave et leve, in quantum dat virtutem per quam
consequitur talis motus." For the doctrine that conservation is not a new action but
is merely a continuation of a prior action, cf. ST 1.104.1 ad 4.
142. Aquinas uses the term generans only of univocal causes, and it is in this
sense that Weisheipl understands it ("Principle Omne quod movetur" p. 92; "Specter,"
pp. 103, 108; so also Selvaggi: see above, n. 134). Aquinas does, however, say that
equivocal causes 'generate' or 'cause generation'; see below, nn. 152, 156. Aristotle,
of course, uses the term τό γεvvητικόv of the heavenly bodies; De generatione et
corruptione 2.10 (336al8-19), in Aήstotle on Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away, ed. H. H.
Joachim (Oxford, 1922); cf. 336b6-9. Physics 8.4 (256al) applies almost the same
term, τό γεvvήσαv, to the per se mover of the heavy and light. At the same time,
both terms normally do refer to a parent.
143. For motions caused immediately upon generation, see CG 3.84 (Adhuc.
Propria); cf. ST 1.105.2c. In De pot. 3.11 ad 5, Aquinas admits that the univocal
generator is understood to move the heavy and light as long as they retain the form
generated by it. Nevertheless, I observe, this moving is not simultaneous with the
motions caused and does not suffice for the production of these motions, as is clear
in the example of projectiles, which are immediately moved by the medium
through which they travel, for Aquinas as for Aristotle.
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form's being acquired by this matter.144 A terrestrial generator, then, is the
cause only of a form's original coming to be and not of its continued
existence. Only an equivocal cause of a given form as such could thereby be
a cause of the continued existence that follows upon form: a causa essendi in
that sense and not merely a causa fiendi. Therefore, only such a cause could
be the per se mover of the heavy and light in all natural motions not
simultaneous with their original generation.
For Aquinas, of course, God, through the divine ideas, is the cause of
all created forms as such. It follows that God causes the actions of natural
things not only by originally giving them their form and their subsequent
natural powers, as does a terrestrial generator, but also by conserving these
in existence.145 In this sense, God, the primary mover of every motion,
causes also 'in a most interior way' the operations of nature.146 In other
words, God as creator and conserver is also the immediate mover of the
heavy and light, just as also of the human intellect and will.147 Accordingly,
Aquinas will speak of nature as an instrument of God148 and as an impres-
sion within things of the divine art of governing itself.149
At the same time, maintains Thomas, there exist even within the
natural world itself equivocal causes of terrestrial forms as such, namely, the
144. ST 1.104.1c. Otherwise, Thomas argues, the generator would be the cause
of its own form, a causa sui. See also De substantiis separatis 10, 11. 126-50, in Opera
omnia, vol. 40. Cf. Aristotle, Met. Z.8 (1033b5-19).
145. ST 1.105.5c: "Unde non solum est [Deus] causa actionum inquantum dat
formam quae est principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus
gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes rerum; prout sol
dicitur causa manifestationis colorum, inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo
manifestantur colores." Cf. De pot. 3.7c: "et hoc modo Deus agit omnes actiones
naturae, quia dedit rebus naturalibus virtutes per quas agere possunt, non solum
sicut generans virtutem tribuit gravi et levi, et earn ulterius non conservat, sed sicut
continue tenens virtutem in esse, quia est causa virtutis collatae, non solum quan-
tum ad fieri sicut generans, sed etiam quantum ad esse, ut sic possit dici Deus causa
actionis in quantum causat et conservat virtutem naturalem in esse."
146. ST 1.105.5c.
147. Cf. ST 1.105.3; 1-2.9.4, 6. On the immediacy of God's causality, see Depot
3.7c (ad fin.), ad 4; SN 2.1.1.4c. Note that God can also be said 'to move nature' in
a way that is beyond nature; see SN 2.1.1.4 ad 3; ST 1.105.6 ad 1.
148. "Nam tota irrationalis natura comparatur ad Deum sicut instrumentum
ad agens principale"; (ST 1-2.1.2c; quoted by Weisheipl, "Aristotle's Concept," p.
146, n. 29). See also CG 3.100 (Amplius. Omnes); Depot. 3.9 ad 21; ST 1-2.6.1 ad
3.
149. ST 1.103.1 ad 3: "necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur
ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem." In Phys. 2.8, 1. 14, n. 8
(268): "natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita
rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum: sicut si artifex factor navis
posset lignis tribuere, quod ex se ipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam."
In Met. 12.10, 1. 12, n. 2634: "Et ipsa natura uniuscuiusque est quaedam inclinatio
indita ei a primo movente, ordinans ipsam in debitum finem."
150. ST 1.104.1c, 2c. On the heavens as exercising causality over entire species,
see SN 2.1.1.4c; De pot. 3.7c; ST 1.13.5 ad 1. On the heavens as the source of
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heavenly bodies, acting through their intellectual movers.150 Through al-
terations in light and heat that they cause, they draw out, cooperating with
terrestrial generators, the forms of all natural things from the potency of
matter.151 Hence, Thomas frequently cites the Aristotelian tag: homo generat
hominem, et sol.152 Furthermore, through their everlasting motion, the heav-
ens cause the continuation of the entire generative process.153 Accordingly,
they are also said to conserve, albeit in a secondary way dependent on God
as the principal agent, the existence of terrestrial substances. Consequently,
for Thomas, on the heavens themselves, as on universal principles of na-
ture,154 depends the natural inclination of all terrestrial substances, and
therefore also their natural motions, like the falling of water.155
Even without resorting to the first cause, then, Thomas holds that there
is in nature itself a universal cause of all terrestrial motion.156 This explains
substantial form through their movers, see SN 2.15.1.2c; De ver. 5.10 ad 4; CG 3.23
(Nihil enim); De malo 5.5 ad 6. On the natures of things produced preexisting in
the conceptions of the celestial intelligences, see CG 2.92 (Amplius. Sicut); De open
occult., 11. 161-69, 185-87; In Met. 12.7,1. 7, n. 2521. On celestial causality generally,
see especially Thomas Litt, Les corps celestes dans Γunivers de saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Louvain/Paris, 1963), pp. 110-99.
151. Cf. ST 1.65.4; 1.67.3 ad 3, on light; SN 2.15.1.1; CG 3.82 (Adhuc. Sicut).
Only in the case of the simplest forms do the heavens generate without univocal
generators, presupposing for 'spontaneous generation' nothing but properly dis-
posed matter. See, for example, CG 3.69 (In animalibus); ST 1.70.3 ad 3; 1.91.2; In
Met. 7.9,1. 8, n. 1457.
152. See, for example, ST 1.115.3 ad 2: "quidquid in istis inferioribus corpori-
bus generat, et movet ad speciem est sicut instrumentum caelestis corporis, secun-
dum quod dicitur in 2 Physicorum" [2.2 (194bl3)]. Litt, p. 275, n. 13, cites
twenty-one parallels.
153. ST 1.104.2c; De ver. 5.9c; De motu cordis, 11. 170-74.
154. See ST 1-2.85.6c for the distinction between particular and universal
nature: "Natura vero universalis est virtus activa in aliquo universali principio
naturae, puta in aliquo caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae,
secundum quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans."
155. According to ST 1.105.6 ad 1, since tidal motion is caused by the same
agent on which depends the natural action of water, namely, the heavens, it is not
contrary to but "praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur deorsum; est enim
ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet naturalis inclinatio inferiorum
corporum."
156. CG 3.24 (Si autem): "Caelum autem est causa inferiorum motuum secun-
dum suum motum, quo movetur a substantia intellectuali. . . . Sunt igitur formae
et motus inferiorum corporum a substantia intellectuali causatae et intentae sicut
a principali agente, a corpore vero caelesti sicut ab instrumento." CG 3.24 (Oportet
autem): Όmnes igitur formae quae sunt in istis inferioribus, et omnes motus,
derivantur a formis intellectualibus quae sunt in intellectu alicuius substantiae, vel
aliquarum." CG 3.24 (Quia vero): "corpus autem caeleste causat per sui motum
omnes motus in istis inferioribus." CG 3.82 (Adhuc. Sicut): Oportet ergo quod
caelum sit causa omnis motus in istis inferioribus corporibus." SN 2.15.1.2c: "dicen-
dum est, corpora caelestia causare generationem et corruptionem in inferioribus,
inquantum motus eorum est causa omnium inferiorum mutationum."
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how Thomas can hold the following: that if and when the heavens cease to
move, all corporeal things will be corrupted into their simplest elements,
and these elements will remain absolutely motionless in their proper
places.157 In short, without the heavens' constant causation present to every
motion,158 no motion can occur. Not surprisingly, therefore, the heavens
also cause all natural motion since they reduce nature as an active principle
from potency to act by conserving the substantial form of natural bodies. At
the same time, emphasizes Aquinas in an important text, we must avoid the
impression that the form alone of such bodies, once possessed, suffices for
motion to occur.159 Instead, no matter how perfect that form is, it cannot
proceed to its act, that is, it cannot be reduced from potency to act without
being moved by the first corporeal mover, as well as by the absolutely first
mover. Through the causality of the heavens and, ultimately, of the first
cause, therefore, Aquinas finds the principle OQM to be fulfilled: every-
thing being moved, including everything being naturally moved, must here
and now be moved by another.160
157. Depot. 5.7-9; InDe caelo 2.3, 1. 4, n. 13 (342).
158. Cf. Depot. 3.7c: "virtutem corporis caelestis oportet adesse cuilibet corpori
elementari agenti." The heavens are present, of course, not through corporeal
contact but through the contact of their power; see above, n. 140. In De pot. 3.7c,
ad 2, however, Aquinas explains that although elementary bodies act by the power
of the heavens, the heavens do not, properly speaking, act in each act of such bodies,
as, for example, in chance or miraculous events.
159. ST 1-2.109.1c: "Videmus autem in corporalibus quod ad motum non
solum requiritur ipsa forma quae est principium motus vel actionis; sed etiam
requiritur motio primi moventis. Primum autem movens in ordine corporalium est
corpus caeleste. Unde quantumcumque ignis habeat calorem perfectum, non alter-
aret nisi per motionem corporis caelestis. Manifestum est autem quod sicut motus
omnes corporales reducuntur in motum caelestis corporis sicut in primum movens
corporale; ita omnes motus tarn corporales quam spirituales reducuntur in primum
movens simpliciter quod est Deus. Et ideo quantumcumque natura aliqua cor-
poralis vel spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere nisi
moveatur a Deo. Quae quidem motio est secundum suae providentiae rationem;
non secundum necessitatem naturae, sicut motio corporis caelestis. Non solum
autem a Deo est omnis motio sicut a primo movente, sed etiam ab ipso est omnis
formalis perfectio sicut a primo actu. Sic igitur actio intellectus et cuiuscumque
entis creati dependent a Deo inquantum ad duo: uno modo, inquantum ab ipso
habet perfectionem sive formam per quam agit; alio modo, inquantum ab ipso
movetur ad agendum."
Although God and the heavens, then, move by conserving the existence of the
formal cause through which motion occurs, it must not be forgotten that they truly
are efficient causes. Cf. ST 1.105.5c.
160. At least one late thirteenth-century thinker presents extended reasoning
that arrives at a conclusion similar to Aquinas's; see pp. 212-13 of William Wallace,
"Gravitational Motion According to Theodoric of Freiburg," in The Dignity of Science,
pp. 191-216. Godfrey of Fontaines intimates a similar conclusion; cf. Maier, "An der
Grenze," p. 162.
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III. RESUME
WeisheipΓs abiding contribution to the history of natural philosophy and
science lies in his insistence that Aristotle's concept of form as the basis of
intelligibility and identity in the real cannot be divorced from form as the
basis of characteristic operations and changes. Yet, precisely how form is to
be the source of the regular behavior even of inanimate bodies remains
unclear in Aristotle. At any rate, Aristotle does not seem to have regarded
the form as a direct moving cause in such bodies, as many scholastics held,
and he sharply distinguishes animate self-motion from the motion of the
heavy and light. Weisheipl has amply brought out this point and has shown
how Aquinas appreciated it in developing an interpretation of nature in
opposition to that familiar to the Arabic philosophers.
At the same time, I have argued, contrary to Weisheipl, that Aquinas
does not conceive of form or nature as a spontaneous source of motions
that are, properly speaking, 'mover-less' or 'causeless'. Such a conception
would make natural rise and fall exceptions to the Aristotelian principle
that every change requires a distinct moving cause. Precisely because of that
principle, however, Aristotle had maintained that in absence of any other
cause, only what makes the heavy and light in the first place can be their
mover.
161
 Instead, Aquinas, seeking to be consistent with observation and
with the principles of Aristotle's philosophy, conceives nature as an intrinsic
quality of certain bodies that leads, without any new forces, to determinate
motions and rests only under the influence of prior, universal efficient
causes. To articulate such a conception, as I have shown, Aquinas develops
a distinction, found verbally in Averroes, between 'nature as formal', refer-
ring to this intrinsic quality, and 'nature as material'. The latter refers to a
characteristic of certain bodies by which they are predisposed to be regu-
larly affected by new forces, but not in any determinate way. Thus, Aquinas
distinguishes two kinds of 'natural motion', one based on nature as a formal
principle and another based on nature as a material principle: within the
same body of water, for example, gravitational motion versus tidal motion,
or within the same animal, the heartbeat versus the use of the limbs.
When Aquinas speaks of nature as a formal and active principle, how-
ever, he does not mean that in certain bodies, the substantial form of itself
simply moves or acts. First, nature as a principle of motion, whether 'formal'
or 'material', principally refers, for him, not to substantial form or matter
but to a passive potency for change, intrinsic to a body but really distinct
from a body's substance. Second, precisely as a passive potency, a body's
nature must be reduced into act by some distinct agent since no potency, as
such, acts. It follows that even nature as an active-formal principle of
161. Aristotle, Phys. 8.4 (255bl3-256a3). See also De caelo 4.3 (310a32-33,
311alO-12). Cf. Aήstotelis Meteorologicorum libή 4, ed. F. H. Fobes (Cambridge, Mass.,
1919), 1.2 (339a21-32).
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motion, as in the heavy and light, requires a constant moving cause in order
to be actualized. What is distinctive about such nature, however, is that it
requires no new moving cause. Instead, such nature is 'active' in the sense
that motion simply follows on it—again, Thomas's explanation follows
Averroes's lead, as I have shown—-just as a necessary property follows on
substantial form. The only mover reducing the heavy and light from po-
tency into act, then, is what gives them their 'active nature', their heaviness
or lightness. I have argued, however, that even their 'generator' is their
proper mover only immediately on their coming to be. Afterward, the per
se mover of the heavy and light, in my reading of Aquinas, is what conserves
their nature in existence, namely, the heavens and, primarily, God, their
creator and prime mover.
This study thus reveals Aquinas's distinctive endeavor to explain ade-
quately the regularity of new events in the world in absence of observed
moving causes. He refuses to surrender the received view of Aristotle that
such events cannot be unmoved and must not be self-moved, unless a
moving organ can be discovered, as in animates. Instead, Aquinas under-
stands such events to stem from a quality of bodies, 'nature as formal and
active'. Nature in this sense, for him, as for Scotus, is partly in act and partly
in potency.162 And yet, for Aquinas, nature as active is emphatically not a
mover, as is nature for Avicenna.163 Nor does it actualize or move itself, as
for Scotus, even accidentally, as for Averroes and Albert. As six elements
comprised in Aquinas's conception show, there is no 'causeless' motion for
Thomas. But even nature as an active principle is fundamentally a passive
potency and, as such, requires a constant moving cause: the heavens and
God.
162. Cf. John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum
Aήstotelis 9.14, in Opera omnia, ed. Vives (Paris, 1891-1895), vol. 7, pp. 584-85. See
Roy Effler, John Duns Scotus and the Pήnciple Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur
(St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1962).
163. See Tractatus pήmus de causis et pήncipiis naturalium, ed. S. Van Riet
(Louvain-la-Neuve/Leiden, 1992), 5.110-22; cf. 11. 85-87. Avicenna follows a tradi-
tion that stems at least from the Greek commentators. See Alexander's position in
The Refutation of Alexander of Aphrodisius of Galen's Treatise on the Theory of Motion, ed.
N. Rescher and M. Marmura (Islamabad, 1967), p. 17, f. C67al7-20. Cf. J. E.
McGuire, "Philoponus on Physics 2.1: Φύσiς, Δύvαμiς, and the Motion of the Simple
Bodies," Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985): 241-67; E. M. Macierowski and R. F. Hassing,
'John Philoponus on Aristotle's Definition of Nature: A Translation from the Greek
with Introduction and Notes," Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 73-100; Lang, Aήstotle's
Physics, pp. 16-17, 106-24.

